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CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT AND
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
ANDREW MCCANSE WRIGHT*
In matters of oversight, Congress and the President have
fundamentally incompatible views of their institutional roles within the
constitutional structure. This Article offers an explanation of divergent
branch behavior and legal doctrine. Congress, much like a party to
litigation, views itself as having fixed substantive rights to obtain desired
information from the Executive and private parties. In contrast, the
Executive views itself like a party to a business transaction, in which
congressional oversight requests are the opening salvo in an iterative
negotiation process to resolve competing interests between co-equal
branches. In general, legislators want to litigate and executive officers
want to negotiate.
Among the formal and informal remedies to enforce its oversight
prerogatives, Congress prefers contempt.
However, contempt is
problematic when the resisting party is an executive branch official
following executive branch policy. Because the constitutional scheme
places a premium on good-faith negotiation between Congress and the
Executive, congressional self-help is generally more appropriate than
* Associate Professor, Savannah Law School. J.D., University of Virginia; B.A.,
Washington & Lee University. Prior to my academic appointment, I served in numerous
positions at the White House and in Congress involved in separation-of-powers conflict,
including Associate Counsel to President Barack Obama, Assistant Counsel to Vice President
Al Gore, and Staff Director of the National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform. I worked on a number of the oversight matters
referenced in this Article. While professional experience informs my perspective, the Article
relies solely on factual information contained in the public domain. Further, the viewpoint
expressed is mine and does not represent the position of any component of Congress or the
Executive.
I benefitted from the opportunity to present this paper concept at the 2013 11th Circuit
Legal Scholarship Forum at Stetson University College of Law, the 2013 Southeastern Law
Scholars Conference at Charleston School of Law, and the 2014 Southeastern Association of
Law Schools (SEALS) New Scholars Workshop. I am grateful to Professors Christopher
Green, Ron Krotoszynski, Bill Marshall, Jim Oleske, Brian Owsley, Kate Shaw, and Judd
Sneirson for constructive comments and criticism during the drafting process. I would also
like to thank Caprice Roberts and Gary Wright for invaluable support, feedback, and
mentorship. Finally, this paper would not have been possible without the outstanding
support of my Research Assistants Justin Iverson and Meagan Rafferty.

882

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:881

litigation for interbranch oversight disputes. While abstention and
restraint should be the hallmark of Article III courts presented with
bickering political branches, there is an important role for the judiciary.
As such, this Article offers principles that guide courts to facilitate, or
approximate, accommodation and compromise.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Practical, day-to-day congressional oversight disputes1 betray a deep
canyon between Congress and the President that cuts to the very
1. Oversight disputes play out in a variety of circumstances, such as exchanging letters
prompted by a congressional committee request for documents, requesting staff- or memberlevel briefings, debating the scheduling and scope of hearings or briefings, haggling over the
availability and appropriateness of hearing witnesses, and negotiating security protocols for
sensitive documents. See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, & Elijah Cummings,
Ranking Member, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Mark J. Sullivan, Dir.,
U.S. Secret Serv. (Apr. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Comm. Letter to Dir. Sullivan]. Congressional
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foundations of our constitutional structure. The Legislative and
Executive Branches live with wholly different, and largely incompatible,
perspectives of the constitutional scheme.
The respective behaviors of Congress and the Executive on matters
of congressional oversight can be best explained through the analogies
of litigation and transactions. Congress largely adopts the model of
litigation and, at times, criminal investigations.2 The Executive, in
contrast, adopts a model of negotiated transactions.3 Each branch
believes its model is firmly grounded in its role within the constitutional
scheme. There are also perfectly rational, self-interested reasons the
political branches choose to adopt these different perspectives.
Legislators view the congressional oversight function as a
constitutional mandate to use litigation-like tools for a variety of
oversight goals, mostly focused on the conduct of the Executive.4 In the
eyes of Congress, there are congressional rules that must be followed,
document requests that should be answered, subpoenas that must be
satisfied, and witnesses that must appear. As such, executive targets of
congressional oversight requests face the binary status of compliance or
noncompliance. To Congress, noncompliance by executive officials
eventually amounts to the crime of contempt.
This perspective ultimately explains the views of House Counsel and
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)5 that Congress has
a presumptive right to obtain any information subject only to the
narrowest of exceptions, and then only when contained in a valid,
formal assertion of executive privilege. Additionally, the litigation
model contemplates a role for Article III courts as a routine instrument
of congressional subpoena enforcement.
committee chairs can escalate by issuing subpoenas or making phone calls to senior
administration officials. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 122
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (“In the course of the investigation, the Subcommittee issued a subpoena for
certain documents in the hands of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. . . . .”).
Eventually, the President might assert executive privilege in the face of a congressional move
to hold an executive branch official in contempt. See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege in
Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 27–28 (1981). All of these disputes have the
feel of tug-of-war over practical line drawing about the quantity and nature of information to
be provided to Congress.
2. See infra Part III.A. For purposes of economy, references to the “litigation model”
will include the concepts of civil litigation and criminal investigations.
3. See infra Part III.B.
4. Some congressional oversight efforts are targeted at other actors, including the
judiciary, state or local governments, international organizations, and private entities.
5. GAO is a congressional, Article I entity and not a part of the Executive.
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In contrast, the Executive envisions itself as a party to an arm’s
length business transaction in which both parties negotiate appropriate
price and terms based on their respective bargaining power. As such,
the Executive’s transactional model lends itself to the principles
articulated by the Office of Legal Counsel across administrations of
different political parties: Congress has legitimate information interests,
but those interests must be balanced against important executive branch
interests in confidentiality. The Executive is also the beneficiary of
inaction. Therefore, the Executive resists a judicial enforcement role,
preferring that outcomes be primarily defined by the relative leverage
allotted to each political branch in a given situation.
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder6 is a
paradigmatic example of the chasm between Congress and the
Executive, and it could prompt the most significant judicial decision in
an interbranch dispute since Watergate. Holder arises out of a
document dispute related to a congressional investigation of “Operation
Fast and Furious.”7 Fast and Furious was a multi-agency investigation
led by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF).8 The core allegation prompting congressional inquiry is that
ATF investigative practices allowed assault weapons that should have
been seized or otherwise controlled into the stream of commerce.9
Further, there is evidence that a number of weapons at issue have been
used in violent crimes on both sides of the U.S.–Mexico border,
including the murder of a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Agent
named Brian Terry.10
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA), in his capacity as Chairman of
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, led the
congressional investigation into Fast and Furious.11 Notwithstanding
6. 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
7. Hereafter, I refer to the operation as “Fast and Furious.”
8. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Hereafter, I refer to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the
U.S. House of Representatives as the “Oversight Committee.” While all committees in the
House have oversight authority related to matters within their jurisdiction, the Oversight
Committee has a much broader investigative mandate that includes “the operation of
Government activities at all levels.” COMM. ON RULES, 111TH CONG., RULES ADOPTED BY
THE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 394 (Comm. Print 2009)
[hereinafter HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED] (Rule X, cl. 3(i)). The U.S.
Senate committee with the closest approximation of the Oversight Committee’s mandate is
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evidence of problematic ATF tactics, the congressional investigation
quickly took on a partisan tone.12 Congressional investigators took
dozens of transcribed interviews, reviewed thousands of pages of
executive branch documents, and obtained other information through in
camera access agreements with the Executive.
The remaining
information sought by the House largely consists of information about
how the Executive responded to congressional inquiry rather than the
underlying ATF activities.13 Eventually, the House threatened to hold
Attorney General Holder in contempt of Congress if he did not produce
the subpoenaed material.14 That threat provoked President Obama to
assert executive privilege.15 Thereafter, the House cited the Attorney
General for contempt and filed suit to enforce its subpoena.16 For those
following the investigation, it has stoked partisan passion and criticism
across the political spectrum.17
That said, the subject matter of congressional–executive disputes
often possesses a partisan character.18 In fact, as many scholars have
noted, disputes between Congress and the President over documents
and witnesses tend to be more frequent and more pronounced during
periods of divided government.19 After the Republicans won the House
the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, although it has primary
jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security in addition to its broader oversight
authority. COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., 112TH CONG., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING
THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, at 98 (2011) [hereinafter SENATE COMM.
ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL]. In the House, that function was assigned to the Committee
on Homeland Security rather than the Oversight Committee. HOUSE COMM. ON RULES,
RULES ADOPTED, supra, at 393 (Rule X, cl. 3(g)(1)).
12. See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, to President Barack Obama 5 (June 25, 2012) [hereinafter Comm. Letter to
President Obama] (outlining the inconsistent responses the Oversight Committee received
from the White House).
13. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 5–6.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 7.
17. See, e.g., Johnathan Weisman & Charlie Savage, House Cites Holder for Contempt
in Gun Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A3; see also Sari Horwitz, A Gunrunning Sting
Gone Fatally Wrong, WASH. POST, July 26, 2011, at A1.
18. See William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 782 (“Congressional investigations . . . provide a
President’s opponents with a considerable opportunity to engage in political mischief.”).
19. There is conclusive, and unsurprising, evidence in the political science literature that
the intensity of congressional oversight of the Executive spikes during periods of divided
government. See Douglas L. Kriner & Eric Schickler, Investigating the President: Committee
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in the 2010 midterm elections, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform developed strongly partisan themes towards the
Obama administration, alleging and investigating political interference,20
financial mismanagement,21 policy failure,22 security incompetence,23

Probes and Presidential Approval, 1953–2006, 76 J. POL. 521, 521 (2014) (“Marshaling an
original data set of more than 3,500 investigative hearings and over 50 years of public opinion
data, we show that increased investigative activity in the hearing room significantly decreases
the president’s job approval rating.”); David C.W. Parker & Matthew Dull, Divided We
Quarrel: The Politics of Congressional Investigations, 1947–2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 319,
321–22 (2009) (finding “congressional investigations activity increases during periods of
divided government” and noting that “[d]ivided government is clearly related to an increase
in the number and intensity of congressional investigations in the House of Representatives,
but evidence of this relationship is much weaker in the Senate”); see also DAVID R.
MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS,
1946–2002, at 3 (2d ed. 2005) (noting the theory that “Congress acting as an investigative body
will give more trouble to the executive branch when a president of the opposite party holds
power”); Douglas Kriner & Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and Congressional
Investigations, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 295, 298 (2008) (“[T]he willingness of Congress to exercise
its oversight powers to constrain the executive is conditional on whether or not investigations
serve the electoral interests of the majority party.”); Robert J. McGrath, Congressional
Oversight Hearings and Policy Control, 38 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 349, 362 (2013) (concluding that
“there are significantly more oversight hearing days for committees controlled by the
presidential out-party than for those controlled by the party of the president”). But see
MAYHEW, supra, at 3 (arguing that congressional oversight activity does not materially
increase in intensity during periods of divided government). To be sure, Congress still
exercises its oversight function when one party controls both a congressional chamber and the
White House, but it tends to take on a different character.
20. See Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, & Jim Jordan, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus
Oversight & Gov’t Spending, to Lois G. Lerner, Dir., Exempt Orgs. Div., IRS (Mar. 27, 2012)
(requesting documents related to IRS questionnaires allegedly targeting conservative political
organizations for review of their tax exempt status).
21. For example, in April 2012, Chairman Issa sent letters to twenty-three executive
branch departments and agencies seeking information on the costs of conferences sponsored
by the federal government that mushroomed into a spending scandal focused primarily on the
General Services Administration. See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(Apr. 10, 2012) (a representative document request letter in the Oversight Committee’s
conference spending investigation that characterizes such conference expenditures as
“frivolous”).
22. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S DISASTROUS MANAGEMENT OF LOAN GUARANTEE
PROGRAMS 2 (Comm. Print 2012) (asserting that taxpayer losses related to the bankruptcy of
Solyndra, which had government-backed loans, were the result of mismanagement by
political appointees at the Department of Energy and represented “just the beginning” of
such losses in the relevant loan program).
23. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG.,
BENGHAZI ATTACKS: INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE —INTERIM REPORT ON THE
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sexual misconduct,24 criminal conduct,25 and obstruction of congressional
inquiry.26 Other committees have also pursued such investigations
within their spheres of jurisdiction.27 While less frequent and intense,
the Democrat-controlled Senate also engaged in significant oversight
activity of the Obama Administration.28 However, the intensity of
divided government oversight will likely resume in light of the
Republican takeover of the Senate in 2015.
Likewise, when the Democrats controlled the House and President
George W. Bush occupied the White House, Representative Henry
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD 9 (Comm. Print 2013) (criticizing the Obama
Administration for the “unnecessary loss of American life” in Benghazi, Libya).
24. See Comm. Letter to Dir. Sullivan, supra note 1 (seeking documents and
information related to solicitation of prostitutes by U.S. Secret Service agents and military
personnel in Colombia in advance of a presidential trip). Ranking Member Cummings joined
this request in a rare show of bipartisanship on the Oversight Committee during Chairman
Issa’s tenure.
25. See Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, to Kathryn Ruemmler, Counsel to the President (July 11, 2011) (alleging “blatant
and potentially illegal use of the White House and other official government resources for
fundraising purposes” in connection with a Democratic National Committee event in the
Blue Room of the White House).
26. See, e.g., Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 2 (alleging the
Oversight Committee had “been stonewalled for months by the Attorney General and his
senior staff” in the Fast and Furious investigation); Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman,
House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Sec’y Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., at 1 (Dec. 11, 2013) (noting that, in connection with the investigation
of problems with the healthcare.gov website, “[t]he Department’s most recent effort to
stonewall . . . has morphed from mere obstinacy into criminal obstruction of a congressional
investigation”); Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, & Jim Jordan, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Econ. Growth, Job Creation &
Regulatory Affairs, to Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, at 1 (Jan. 8,
2014) (asserting that “the FBI’s blatant lack of cooperation with the Committee may rise to
the level of criminal obstruction of a congressional investigation” into alleged IRS targeting
of conservative organizations).
27. See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
112TH CONG., THE SOLYNDRA FAILURE (Comm. Print 2012) (outlining Republican staff
perspectives on U.S.-backed energy loans to Solyndra and other green technology
companies); Memorandum from the Majority Staff to the Republican Members of the Energy
& Commerce Comm. (May 31, 2012) (presenting Republican members of the committee with
allegations of congressional exclusion from Obama Administration negotiations with private
health care industry stakeholders); Memorandum from the Majority Staff to Republican
Members of the Energy & Commerce Comm. (June 8, 2012) (elaborating further on the
status of the investigation).
28. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REVIEW OF THE
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 11–12, 2012,
S. REP. NO. 113-134 (2014) (criticizing the Executive for failing to prevent the Benghazi
attacks).
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Waxman (D-CA) used his chairmanship of the Oversight Committee to
investigate a wide variety of issues that took on a partisan tone.29 In
fact, it was during that era, albeit involving a different committee, that
the district court decided Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers,30
foreshadowing the early rulings in Holder.
Such situational partisan disputes play out against the backdrop of
remarkably stable, but conflicting, institutional perspectives of Capitol
Hill and the White House. Most of the time, congressional oversight
operates under the radar. Often it involves informal, staff-to-staff
communication between agencies and their committees of jurisdiction.
As repeat players on budget negotiations and authorizations, the staffs
of the committees and the agencies within their jurisdiction have strong
incentives to resolve information disputes informally.
In other
instances, institutional conflict is real, but Congress lacks political will to
escalate, or the issues involved have not caught the public imagination
beyond the small Washington news outlets that effectively serve as trade
publications for political professionals. They are more brush fire than
blaze. However, as with Miers and Holder, congressional oversight
disputes can rapidly reach full-blown constitutional conflagration.
This Article argues that the constitutional scheme places a premium
on good faith negotiation between Congress and the Executive
backstopped by rare instances of judicial resolution. Both branches’
models have functional advantages but also claim too much in that the
Executive categorically rejects justiciability while Congress rejects the
29. See HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., ACTIVITIES
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, H.R. REP. NO. 110-930,
at 1 (2008) (chronicling over 200 oversight hearings and identifying major investigations
examining “waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq reconstruction and other government contracting;
the activities of Blackwater and other private security contractors; the politicization of science
in federal agencies; White House mismanagement of federal records; . . . formaldehyde levels
in FEMA trailers; the treatment of wounded returning soldiers at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center; and misleading veterans’ charities” as well as “[o]ther investigations examin[ing] the
disclosure of CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity . . . [and] the fratricide of Army
Ranger Patrick Tillman”).
30. 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). The dispute in Miers related to the House
Committee on the Judiciary (Judiciary Committee) investigation of the abrupt termination of
nine presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorneys. Id. at 57–58. In the course
of the investigation, the Judiciary Committee sought documents from the White House and
testimony from senior White House aides. Id. at 58. Pursuant to an assertion of executive
privilege by President George W. Bush, former White House Counsel Harriet Miers resisted
a subpoena commanding her appearance as a witness at a congressional hearing. Id. at 62.
Under the same assertion of executive privilege, White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten
resisted production of documents or a log of withheld documents. Id.
OF THE
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merits of executive privilege. A litigation model mitigates unchecked
executive power, especially when there is the specter of judicial
enforcement of oversight requests where congressional self-help fails. A
transactional model recognizes legitimate competing institutional
interests, especially when there is no meaningful due process or other
procedural constraint on politically motivated, non-germane, and
unduly burdensome requests.
In cases of impasse, Congress primarily enforces its requests through
political self-help remedies rather than outsourcing enforcement to the
courts. When Congress does seek judicial enforcement, restraint is
generally the hallmark of Article III tribunals presented with bickering
political branches.31 However, in order to preserve the constitutional
scheme and provide a deterrent to executive intransigence, the judiciary
reserves the power to intervene in the event of a constitutional crisis.32
As discussed below, the initial two rulings in Holder—one finding the
matter justiciable and the other requiring the production of an executive
privilege log—signal the court’s sensitivity to the delicate separation-ofpowers issues at stake.33
In order to bring these arguments to the fore, the Article addresses
the oversight function, the respective branch views, potential remedies
for oversight frustration, and the role of the judiciary. Part II outlines
the constitutional basis for the oversight function. It also addresses the
scope and some limitations of that function. Part III sets forth the
fundamentally different, and inconsistent, constitutional visions held by
Congress and the Executive. Part IV analyzes the various remedies
Congress has used to enforce its oversight prerogatives. It also describes
the problematic issue of judicial involvement in congressional–executive
disputes. Part V examines the Holder litigation as an illustration of the
political branches’ competing views and of the thorny issues the
litigation presents to the court called in to resolve the dispute.
This Article begins a body of work designed to construct conceptual
frameworks that explain congressional oversight confrontations. Legal
academic research on congressional oversight tends to focus on formal
31. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (M.D.
Fla. 1977) (“Disputes and confrontations between those branches always present the kinds of
stress and tension that threaten to separate and divide those lines into chasms, ultimately
collapsing our constitutionally created form of government. Hence, to avert and minimize
such tensions is always the proper and prudent course of action.”).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–04 (1974).
33. See infra Part V.B.
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processes rather than the divergent constitutional perspectives that drive
interbranch conflict.34 This Article offers an explanation of divergent
branch behavior and legal doctrine. In sum, this Article envisions a
unified theory of congressional oversight that recognizes enduring
conflict, tension, and disagreement between the political branches.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND SCOPE
OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
A. A Preliminary Note on Constitutional
Analysis of Separation of Powers
One of the challenges associated with analyzing the constitutional
authority for the congressional oversight function is that all three
branches of the federal government have their own perspective on the
question. Legal scholars traditionally look to the Supreme Court for
definitive pronouncements about the scope and meaning of
constitutional issues. However, with respect to the delineation of
powers in the separation of powers scheme, the views and historical
practices of a branch as to its own power vis-à-vis coordinate branches
have independent constitutional significance.35
In United States v. Nixon,36 the Supreme Court offered a classic
formulation of separation of powers: “In designing the structure of our
Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among
three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to
provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not
intended to operate with absolute independence.”37 Separation of
powers is the structural division of state sovereignty into three

34. As will be discussed, the weight of legal research on congressional oversight focuses
on congressional subpoenas, assertions of executive privilege, and academic lamentation of
ineffective oversight efforts. Political science research also addresses these topics, and it
provides further insight into the frequency of oversight activity, especially as a function of
divided government. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. This Article contributes
context to the informal oversight motivations, interactions, and perspectives that create the
context in which formal interbranch conflict occurs.
35. See generally Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government
of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461,
471–84 (1987) (arguing that each branch has a separate legal doctrine of executive privilege).
36. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
37. Id. at 707.
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functional institutions.38 These branches are characterized by coequality, and the separation between them relates to functions of
governance. The Nixon court also recognized that the powers are not
self-contained and hermetically sealed.39 Instead, at the edges, powers
may bleed and powers may blend. Thus, Justice Jackson observed in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer40 that there exists a “zone of
twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”41
Such
indeterminacy may also exist with respect to executive–judicial or
congressional–judicial allocations.
This structure has consequences for constitutional analyses that are
unique to the separation of powers context. In Nixon, the Supreme
Court recognized the legitimacy of its sister branches in constitutional
analysis:
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch
of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and
the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great
respect from the others. . . . Many decisions of this Court,
however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury
v. Madison, that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”42
As such, the Nixon formulation recognizes that each branch has a
role in constitutional interpretation, in which the Supreme Court is first
among equals rather than the exclusive arbiter of power allocation.43
However, as “first” branch, the Constitution reserves to the Supreme
Court the final word in matters of formal constitutional interpretation.44
These structural considerations have implications for purposes of
this Article. First, the structure enhances the constitutional significance
of non-judicial-branch views on allocation of power. Second, because
oversight interactions between Congress and the Executive almost
universally occur without any judicial involvement, as a functional
38. State sovereignty is further divided by those powers reserved to the states as a
matter of federalism and those rights granted to citizens as the Constitution was amended.
39. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
40. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
41. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 703–04.
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matter, the likelihood of judicial involvement is remote. Third, as
discussed more fully below, judicial review of inter branch oversight
disputes is problematic because, under certain circumstances, review
itself could disturb allocation of power between Congress and the
Executive in unhealthy ways.
B. The Constitutional Basis of Congressional Oversight
A threshold question arises as to the basis of congressional authority
to conduct oversight. While the Constitution invests Congress with
“[a]ll legislative Powers,”45 it is silent as to inquiry power. The Supreme
Court recognizes “there is no provision expressly investing either house
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative function advisedly and effectively.”46 Rather,
the power is incidental to the legislative power itself and supported by
the historical practice of English and American legislative institutions.47
It is firmly settled that the congressional oversight function is grounded
in the legislative powers granted to Congress in Article I.48 On this
point, all three branches of government are in basic agreement.
1. Congress
Congress itself routinely cites the constitutional imprimatur of its
oversight function. According to a congressional oversight manual
published by a component of the Library of Congress, “The
Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and
investigate executive branch activities.”49 During the 111th Congress,
the Republican staff of the House Oversight Committee issued a report

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
Id.
Id.
FREDERICK M. KAISER, WALTER J. OLESZEK & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 4 (2011), available at http://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7ZB8-LZ7C; see also ALISSA
M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1920–2012: HISTORY, LAW, AND PRACTICE 3 (2012)
(“While there is no express provision of the Constitution or specific statute authorizing the
conduct of congressional oversight or investigations, the Supreme Court has firmly
established that such power is essential to the legislative function as to be implied from the
general vesting of legislative powers in Congress.”).
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entitled, “A Constitutional Obligation: Congressional Oversight of the
Executive Branch.”50
There are also a number of scholarly sources upon which Congress
relies to assert the constitutional basis of its oversight power. For
example, Congress regularly quotes Woodrow Wilson: “Quite as
important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.”51
Further, congressional sources credit Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. for his
introductory comments to the multi-volume work, Congress Investigates,
that
no provision of the American Constitution gave Congress
express authority to conduct investigations and compel
testimony. But it was not considered necessary to make an
explicit grant of such authority. The power to make laws implied
the power to see whether they were faithfully executed. The
right to secure needed information had long been deemed by
both the British Parliament and the colonial assemblies as a
necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate.52
Congress will also, of course, rely on the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the implied constitutional basis of its oversight
authority.53 In addition, Congress codified its oversight responsibility
for “continuous watchfulness” over executive agencies in the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946.54
2. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]here can be no doubt as to
the power of Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate

50. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., A
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION].
51. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 297 (1885). For examples of congressional reliance on this quotation, see, for
example, A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION, supra note 50, at 3; JOINT COMM. ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS, FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 103-413, vol. II, S. REP. NO. 103-215, vol. II,
at 150 (1993) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 4.
52. 1 CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 1792–1974, at xix (Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975). For examples of congressional citation to this
work, see, for example, A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION, supra note 50, at 3; FINAL
REPORT, supra note 51, at 151.
53. KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 5.
54. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 136, 60 Stat. 812, 832.
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matters and conditions related to contemplated legislation.”55 Early in
the Republic, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s power to hold
citizens in contempt in Anderson v. Dunn.56 There, the Court dismissed
a trespass action by a plaintiff, who had been held in contempt for
attempting to bribe a member of Congress, on the basis that
congressional contempt power was valid.57 A lower federal court next
addressed contempt ten years after the Civil War in Stewart v. Blaine,58
where the contempt finding was grounded in a refusal to cooperate with
a congressional inquiry.
The court did not specifically address
congressional power to conduct the inquiry but rather relied on
Anderson, applying stare decisis principles as a basis to dismiss a tort
action.59 Over the next several decades, parties litigated contempt in
both oversight and non-oversight contexts, but none of them specifically
addressed congressional power to investigate.60
The Supreme Court finally articulated the constitutional basis for
congressional oversight in McGrain v. Daugherty,61 nearly 150 years
after the Founding. There, the Court was squarely presented with the
question of whether “power to make investigations and exact testimony
. . . is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.”62 The
Court noted that legislative practice after and predating the American
Revolution had involved a power to secure needed information.63 It
surveyed a number of state court opinions that recognized the power of
The Court then reviewed contempt cases,
legislative inquiry.64
construing them to mean (1) both chambers of Congress have “not only
such powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but
such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the
55. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955).
56. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 234 (1821).
57. Id.
58. 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453 (1874).
59. Id. at 458.
60. Some cases bore on the question of congressional oversight power by implication.
For example, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), the Court held that Congress’s
contempt finding was improper because the underlying investigation amounted to
congressional usurpation of a judicial function. 103 U.S. at 192–93. So, while silent as to
congressional power to investigate, it clearly delineated, by negative inference, a zone of
inquiry that was beyond any such power.
61. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
62. Id. at 161.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 165–66 (citing opinions in Massachusetts, New York, Wisconsin, West
Virginia, Missouri, and South Carolina).
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express powers effective,”65 and (2) neither chamber is “invested with
‘general’ power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures,
but only with such limited power of inquiry” as is necessary to support
its express and implied powers.66
Ultimately, the Court held that “the power of inquiry—with process
to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.”67 The Court further articulated:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change . . . . Experience has
taught that mere requests for such information often are
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are
essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and
when the Constitution was framed and adopted. . . . Thus there
is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional
provisions which commit the legislative function to the two
houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the
function may be effectively exercised.68
In the Court’s view, Congress cannot legislate without information,
and therefore congressional power to inform must derive from the
constitutional structure.69 Thereafter, Supreme Court recognition of
congressional oversight power solidified. As Chief Justice Warren
noted in Quinn v. United States,
There can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or
through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions
relating to contemplated legislation. This power, deeply rooted
in American and English institutions, is indeed co-extensive with
the power to legislate. Without the power to investigate—
including of course the authority to compel testimony either
through its own processes or through judicial trial—Congress
could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its
constitutional functions wisely and effectively.70

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 173.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 175.
Id.
349 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
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Recognizing congressional oversight’s important function in the
American governmental structure, the Supreme Court confirmed
oversight is grounded in the Constitution.
3. The Executive
Even the Executive, which most often falls under the unpleasant
scrutiny
of
congressional
investigators,
acknowledges
the
constitutionality, if not the constitutional basis, of the exercise. The
Office of Legal Counsel advised President Reagan’s Attorney General
that
[i]t is beyond dispute that Congress may conduct investigations
in order to obtain facts pertinent to possible legislation and in
order to evaluate the effectiveness of current laws. . . . Although
the Constitution does not explicitly grant any power of inquiry to
Congress, Congress asserted such a right shortly after the
adoption of the Constitution.71
Similarly, a Clinton Administration communication to Congress
recognized that “[t]he oversight process is, of course, an important
underpinning of the legislative process.”72
Thus, the Executive
acknowledges Congress’s legitimate authority to conduct oversight but
resists affirmatively conceding that such authority flows directly from
the Constitution.
C. The Scope and Limitations of Congressional Oversight
While the constitutional authority to conduct congressional
oversight is well established, the scope of that authority is a much more
complicated subject. Scope and limitation of congressional oversight are
borne of conflict and thus intersect with the subject matter of this
Article. Sources of limitation on congressional authority may derive
from judicial opinions, subject resistance, investigative jurisdiction,
congressional self-regulation, and interbranch dispute. Limitation on
oversight authority, especially involving interbranch conflict, is in
dispute and largely unsettled. The following subsections chart the
discernable scope and limits in this amorphous area.
71. Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Exec.
Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60 (1985) (footnote omitted).
72. Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Att’y Gen., to John Linder, Chairman, House
Subcomm. on Rules & Org. of the House 1 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Assistant Att’y Gen.
Raben Letter to Chairman Linder].
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1. Limited Paths to Judicial Resolution
While courts have had occasion to consider interbranch
congressional oversight disputes, the case law is sparse and unsettled. A
paucity of definitive case law is understandable considering that such
disputes rarely move into litigation. Even when congressional oversight
disputes reach the courts, the judiciary confronts traditional reluctance
to insert itself into disputes between the political branches.
Professor Paul Freund cautioned that “[i]n the eighteenth-century
Newtonian universe that is the Constitution, an excessive force in one
direction is apt to produce a corresponding counterforce.”73 However,
in the modern universe of quantum theory, a more apt analogy for the
courts in the congressional oversight context is the Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle74: the act of court review itself—its mere gaze—
could have unintended and damaging consequences to the constitutional
scheme.75
There are several routes through which congressional oversight
disputes have reached Article III courts. The most common has been in
the context of a criminal prosecution for contempt of Congress.76 There
73. Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term—Foreword: On Presidential
Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20 (1974).
74. In 1927, at a research institute in Copenhagen, Denmark, physicist Werner
Heisenberg had an epiphany about the nature and limits of physical knowledge. Specifically,
at the subatomic level, the act of observing alters the reality being observed. For example, if
one tries to view an electron, one needs a measuring device such as light or radiation.
However, the energy emitted from the chosen device will alter the course of the electron
itself. See Jan Hilgevoord & Jos Uffink, The Uncertainty Principle, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 8, 2001), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertai
nty/ (last updated July 3, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/3UB-F57Q.
75. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 20, Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-01332ABJ) [hereinafter Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss], ECF No. 13-1 (urging the court
not to reach the merits of the interbranch dispute over executive branch materials
subpoenaed by Congress and subject to an assertion of executive privilege by President
Obama because “[a]n assumption of jurisdiction here would . . . threaten to alter permanently
the relationship among the Branches”).
76. See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 110 (1963) (considering an appeal by
a private citizen following his conviction for contempt of Congress for failure to answer
questions posed by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities);
Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 607 (1962) (affirming a conviction for criminal
contempt of Congress where refusal to answer questions implicated self-incrimination in a
state court prosecution); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 382–83 (1960) (affirming a
conviction for criminal contempt in the face of, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment challenge to
the underlying subpoena’s breadth); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959)
(affirming a conviction for criminal contempt of Congress in the face of a First Amendment
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are some cases that arise out of criminal prosecution for crimes against
Congress,77 and others brought by parties seeking to enjoin or quash
congressional subpoenas.78 More rarely, courts have had occasion to
consider a writ of habeas corpus against the appropriate agent of
Congress itself.79 The Supreme Court has heard tort actions against the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the U.S. House of Representatives80 and against

challenge); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957) (reversing a criminal contempt
conviction based on a violation of the due process clause in light of committee’s questioning
that had little nexus to the matter under inquiry); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165
(1955) (ordering entry of a judgment of acquittal where a defendant appealed his criminal
contempt conviction on the grounds that he had invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 (1953) (affirming the
reversal of a contempt conviction because the committee exceeded its authority); Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263, 284, 288, 299 (1929) (affirming a conviction for contempt in
connection with the Teapot Dome scandal); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897)
(upholding the constitutionality of the criminal contempt of Congress statute in the context of
an appeal from conviction); United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(reviewing a street gang member’s conviction for contempt of Congress for failure to testify,
while under congressional subpoena, before a Senate subcommittee); Tobin v. United States,
306 F.2d 270, 271, 275–76 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (reversing a contempt conviction of the Executive
Director of the New York Port Authority by finding the committee’s request exceeded its
mandate); Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97, 97–98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (affirming
conviction for contempt of Congress).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501, 1502 (D.D.C. 1989)
(addressing a subpoena of presidential records in a prosecution for false statements to, and
obstruction of, Congress); United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1448, 1449–50 (D.D.C. 1989)
(quashing a subpoena of former President Ronald Reagan to appear in a criminal prosecution
for perjury before Congress).
78. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 492–93 (1975) (reviewing an
appeal brought by organization bank depositor seeking to enjoin the implementation of a
congressional subpoena for organization’s records directed to the bank).
79. In such cases, Congress is the detaining authority because it has exercised inherent
contempt power and detained an uncooperative target by means of the Sergeant-at-Arms of
one of either the House or Senate. See, e.g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151–52
(1935) (reversing the appellate court’s grant of relief on a writ of habeas corpus, finding that
Congress has the power to punish a completed act by means of inherent contempt power);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 180 (1927) (reversing a district court order discharging a
Senate witness from custody because the investigation of corruption aided the legislative
function); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 530–32, 548 (1917) (granting relief on a writ of
habeas corpus filed by a New York district attorney who was arrested for contempt by the
U.S. House of Representatives).
80. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 204–06 (1821) (affirming a demurrer
judgment entered for the defendant Sergeant-at-Arms that barred an action in trespass for
false imprisonment, assault, and battery by a person held in contempt of Congress for an
attempt to bribe a member).
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the Speaker of the House.81
One district court considered oversight power in the context of a
motion by a congressional subcommittee chair to obtain grand jury
material.82
More recently, Congress, as a body and through
subcomponent parties, has sought enforcement of its subpoenas against
the Executive Branch in civil court proceedings.83 In addition, a
congressional component sought to vindicate statutory investigative
power against Vice President Richard Cheney.84 In one notable case,
the D.C. Circuit had occasion to address an action brought by the U.S.
Department of Justice seeking to enjoin a private party from complying
with a congressional subpoena.85
2. Legal Precedent on Congressional Oversight
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized an extremely broad
congressional mandate to conduct oversight. In Barenblatt v. United
States,86 the Court suggested the “scope of the power of inquiry . . . is as
penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and
appropriate under the Constitution.”87 In another case, the Court
described the power as “broad.”88 As such, the courts are predisposed
to give Congress wide latitude in terms of legitimate jurisdictional

81. Stewart v. Blaine, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453, 457 (1874) (shielding the Speaker from
liability for executing an inherent contempt order because it would be “monstrous . . . to hold
him liable . . . for merely obeying an order of the House”).
82. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1302, 1304–05 (M.D.
Fla. 1977) (granting a motion by a congressional subcommittee chairman for copies of
documents related to a grand jury proceeding once the jury had been discharged, subject to
issuance of a congressional subpoena to the relevant U.S. Attorney).
83. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (considering a Senate committee challenge to an assertion of
executive privilege by President Nixon as a basis for withholding information sought by a
subpoena); Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3 (D.D.C.
2013); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2008).
84. See Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53, 74 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding the dispute
nonjusticiable given the absence of a congressional subpoena).
85. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 122–23 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(addressing an action brought by the Department of Justice against a telephone carrier
seeking to enjoin its compliance with a subpoena issued by the House of Representatives in
connection with a congressional investigation into warrantless national security wiretaps).
86. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
87. Id. at 111.
88. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
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interests in oversight matters. However, as discussed more fully below,
this formulation is not without limits.89
A number of cases recognize the subject-matter breadth of
congressional investigative power. First, Congress may investigate
subjects relevant to its consideration of prospective legislation.90 This
rationale hews closest to the constitutional theory animating oversight
power: that the power to investigate is incident to legislative power.91
For example, in Quinn v. United States, the Supreme Court observed
that “[t]here can be no doubt as to the power of Congress . . . to
investigate matters and conditions relating to contemplated
legislation.”92 This is a temporally prospective endeavor, meaning
present inquiry will inform future policy judgments.
Second, the Supreme Court recognizes congressional power to
investigate the administration of existing laws. In Watkins v. United
States,93 Chief Justice Warren observed that congressional oversight
power “encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws” in addition to contemplated legislation.94 Here, Congress is
interested in whether its enactments and policy preferences are being
followed.95 This present tense rationale also more closely implicates the
activities of the other branches of the federal government, in which the
judiciary is reviewing and construing existing law while the Executive is
assisting the President with the obligation to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”96 As such, the stage begins to set for
interbranch conflict over matters of congressional oversight.
A logical corollary to a power to investigate the administration of
the laws is a power that “comprehends probes into departments of the

89. See id. (observing that, “broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited”).
90. See, e.g., Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111–12 (“Congress may only investigate into those
areas in which it may potentially legislate . . . .”).
91. See id.
92. 349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955); see also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (acknowledging
congressional power to conduct “inquiries concerning . . . proposed or possibly needed
statutes”).
93. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
94. Id. at 187.
95. See Charles M. Cameron & B. Peter Rosendorff, A Signaling Theory of
Congressional Oversight, 5 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 44, 46 (1993) (observing that
oversight may constitute a “credible signal about the committee’s resoluteness . . . and may
have dramatic effects on its behavior” with respect to policy choices).
96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”97
Such investigations have rationales rooted in the present and the future.
Private parties, especially contractors and grantees of the federal
government, may be swept within the ambit of these government
malfeasance investigations. However, in inquiries motivated by this
rationale, the Executive Branch will be in the crosshairs as a regular
matter. The Supreme Court has even recognized that “[v]igilant
oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of
office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment.”98 With a
power, or perhaps obligation, to investigate the activities of coordinate
branches of government, the die is cast for constitutional conflict.
As such, there are three principal legal rationales for congressional
investigative power: prospective legislation, present execution of law,
and government misconduct. However, as a functional matter in the
real world of politics, there are somewhat different incentives that shape
oversight conduct by Congress and its members.
3. Functional Congressional Oversight Goals
Oversight disputes play out in a variety of circumstances, such as
exchanging letters prompted by a congressional committee request for
documents, requesting staff- or member-level briefings, debating the
scheduling and scope of hearings or briefings, haggling over the
availability and appropriateness of hearing witnesses, and negotiating
security protocols for sensitive documents. Congressional committee
chairs can escalate a dispute by issuing subpoenas or making phone calls
to senior administration officials. If things have really gone off the rails,
the White House might assert executive privilege in the face of a
congressional move to hold an executive branch official in contempt.99
All of these disputes have the feel of tug-of-war over practical linedrawing about the quantity and nature of information to which Congress
is entitled.
In practice, there are complex and dynamic motivations for
congressional oversight. The Congressional Oversight Manual lists a
97. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
98. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982). Nixon addressed presidential
immunity from suit and was not a case evaluating the constitutional bases of oversight, so this
quotation is more functional observation than sanction. Id. at 733.
99. See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op.
O.L.C. 27, 27–28 (1981) (advising the President that his executive privilege applied to
documents requested by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce).
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ranging set of purposes: ensuring executive compliance with legislative
intent, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental
operations, evaluating program performance, preventing executive
encroachment on legislative functions, investigating misconduct and
waste, assessing agency and executive officer performance, establishing
federal financial priorities, ensuring that executive policies reflect the
public interest, and protecting individual rights and liberties.100
Members and committees of Congress may also employ oversight as a
means of promoting or enforcing policy preferences101 and encouraging
government transparency.102 Congress’s self-conception of the goals of
oversight transcends the case law to date.
One undeniable incentive for congressional oversight is partisanship.
When the President is from one political party and the other party
controls either the House or Senate, or both,103 there is a strong
incentive to use congressional oversight as a partisan bludgeon.104 There
is a wealth of political science research that demonstrates the correlation
between divided government and increased volume and intensity of
congressional oversight.105
During these times, congressional
committees can develop salient political themes of corruption,
incompetence, and policy failure.106 In addition, sometimes there are
political benefits to picking a process fight over documents or testimony

100. KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 1–3.
101. See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 19, at 369–70 (“The research presented in this article
underscores the importance of legislative competence to oversee the administration of
popularly promulgated policies. Without the threat of oversight hearings, the ‘inner check’ is
hardly likely to maintain the balance between bureaucracy and democracy.”).
102. According to Representative Darrell Issa, “transparency and real effectiveness of
government requires . . . the vigorous oversight and demanding of transparency by the
committees.” Campbell Brown (CNN television broadcast Feb. 3, 2010), transcript available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1002/03/ec.01.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
K4YC-A9TV.
103. In line with political science lexicon, I refer to this phenomenon as “divided
government.”
104. See Kriner & Schickler, supra note 19, at 521 (“Marshaling an original data set of
more than 3,500 investigative hearings and over 50 years of public opinion data, we show that
increased investigative activity in the hearing room significantly decreases the president’s job
approval rating.”).
105. See supra note 19.
106. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 782.
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as a means, in itself, of generating confrontation with a president from
the opposite party.107
Occasionally, congressional oversight efforts appear to be designed
to influence an ongoing adjudication.108 This can be particularly
problematic from the executive branch perspective because Congress
risks corrupting an adjudicative process in which parties have fixed due
process rights.109 In a similar vein, congressional actors sometimes
employ oversight as a means of influencing an ongoing executive branch
rulemaking process in an effort to supplement the notice-and-comment
process, among other formal means for Congress’s input.110
Members of Congress have more personal, political, and institutional
incentives to engage in congressional oversight. Committee chairs may
be able to use oversight as a platform to make a name for themselves in
chambers teeming with members trying to distinguish themselves.111
107. Id. at 809 (“Regardless of whether he chooses to comply with a document request
or to fight it, the President incurs serious political risks in responding to a congressional
investigation.”).
108. A good example of this type of oversight is the Oversight Committee’s focus on the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) during the 112th Congress. On April 20, 2011, the
NLRB filed an unfair labor practices complaint against the Boeing Company (Boeing)
related to allegations by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
One month later, Chairman Issa and two subcommittee chairs sent a document request letter
declaring that the Oversight Committee was “conducting oversight of recent legal actions”
taken by the NLRB’s Office of General Counsel. Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Health
Care, D.C., Census and the Nat’l Archives, & Dennis Ross, Chairman, House Subcomm. on
Fed. Workforce, U.S. Postal Serv., and Labor Policy, to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen.
Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Board (May 12, 2011). During the ensuing dispute, which
included a congressional subpoena, the NLRB took the position that the congressional
requests would undermine important confidentiality interests designed to protect the integrity
of an open enforcement action, that premature disclosure of such information would
“seriously compromise the litigation,” and that such disclosure would “give one litigant an
unfair advantage over another.” See, e.g., Letter from Celeste J. Mattina, Acting Deputy
Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Board, to Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C.,
Census and the Nat’l Archives, & Dennis Ross, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Fed.
Workforce, U.S. Postal Serv., and Labor Policy 2 (May 27, 2011); Letter from Lafe E.
Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Board, to Darrell Issa, Chairman,
House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (July 26, 2011).
109. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
110. See Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Exec.
Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 60–61 (1985).
111. Matthew Dull & David C.W. Parker, Congressional Oversight: Overlooked or
Unhinged?, LEGIS. STUD. SEC. NEWSL.: EXTENSION OF REMARKS, July 2012, at 2 (Am.
Political Sci. Ass’n, Norman, Okla.) (discussing a body of political science scholarship finding
that “committee hearings offer members and parties prominent venues for building
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Historians largely credit wartime oversight efforts with Harry Truman’s
ascent to Vice President and ultimately President.112 Congressional
oversight represents an opportunity for a symbiotic relationship with a
press corps that has incentives to write stories about scandal. The press
can bring Congress oversight leads or expose issues worthy of
congressional attention, and Congress can provide the press with
documents and testimony that drive stories.113
In addition, unique congressional district considerations can fuel
oversight efforts. For example, Representative Michael Turner (R-OH)
became engaged in efforts to reform the U.S. military’s sexual assault
prevention and response efforts due to a grisly homicide of a Marine
whose family resides in his district.114 Part of his reform efforts included
exacting oversight of ongoing military sexual assault prevention
activities.115 Similarly, interest groups may be the primary advocates for
certain oversight priorities that eventually find a congressional patron.
Finally, a congressional committee or actor may engage in punitive
oversight. A committee may seek retribution for some act by an
executive branch entity or official by means of its oversight power.116
Thus, the oversight enterprise would be designed to punish, as either a
deterrence or retributive matter, rather than inform a legislative
judgment. While punishment may be a true animating force in a given
oversight action, it is hard to establish as an isolated factual matter.

reputations, contrasting government incompetence with their own commitment to good
government”).
112. See ROBERT DALLECK, HARRY S. TRUMAN 12 (2008); see also DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 285–87 (1992).
113. For a story that reveals a colorful version of this symbiotic relationship between
journalists and oversight activities, see Mark Leibovich, How to Win in Washington, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., July 7, 2013, at 18, 22.
114. See Congressman Turner Leads Efforts to Protect Sexual Assault Survivors in
Military Justice System, TURNER.HOUSE.GOV (Nov. 6, 2013), http://turner.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/congressman-turner-leads-efforts-to-protect-sexual-assault-survivors-in,
archived at http://perma.cc/NT86-XJE2. See also his campaign website article, Combating
Sexual Assault in Our Military, MIKETURNER.COM (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.miketurner.co
m/blog/2011/04/17/combating-sexual-assault-in-our-military/, archived at http://perma.cc/3L85
-CPCF, in which he discusses the sexual assault and murder of Lance Corporal Maria
Lauterbach by a senior enlisted member of her unit. She grew up in Dayton, Ohio. Id.
115. See Combating Sexual Assault in Our Military, supra note 114.
116. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 545–46 (1917). But see Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228–29 (1821) (recognizing a limited punitive power for the House of
Representatives to punish a non-member on facts implicating the constitutional provision
allowing Congress to punish its own membership).
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Human motivations are dynamic, complex, and sometimes selfcontradictory; Congress’s motivations are no different.
One can debate whether these incentives translate into appropriate
levels, and types, of oversight activities. Social science literature and
public policy commentary are rife with lamentations that Congress has
abdicated its oversight responsibilities117 to the benefit of a growing and
unchecked Executive Branch.118 Some commentators suggest that there
are significant disincentives to conducting robust oversight.119 It can be
an unpleasant experience.120 Others take the view that congressional
structure and incentives lead to emphasis on less meaningful
oversight.121 There is also a camp that believes congressional oversight
is on the upswing since Watergate122 or the New Deal.123
117. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT 67–70 (1977); John F. Bibby, Congress’ Neglected Function, in REPUBLICAN
PAPERS 477 (Melvin R. Laird ed., 1968); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
165, 165 (1984) (“Scholars often complain that Congress has neglected its oversight
responsibility: despite a large and growing executive branch, Congress has done little or
nothing to oversee administrative compliance with legislative goals.”); Morris S. Ogul,
Congressional Oversight: Structures and Incentives, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 207, 207–
21 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1977); James B. Pearson, Oversight: A
Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 277, 281 (1975)
(“Paradoxically, despite its importance, congressional oversight remains basically weak and
ineffective.”).
118. See generally PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE
POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).
119. See Ogul, supra note 117, at 209.
120. Indeed, some materials describe congressional staffers who feel demoralized by
executive branch intransigence. See, e.g., PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, THE ART OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: A USER’S GUIDE TO DOING IT RIGHT 9 (2009) (noting that
“[m]eaningful congressional oversight is hard work” and warning congressional investigators
to “expect personal attacks” (title case removed)); MORTON ROSENBERG, THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING: A PRIMER ON THE
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES AND PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 65 (2009), available
at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/175.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4PYV2LQ6 (noting that due to “a lengthy period of legislative passivity in the face of serious
executive challenges . . . there remains in Congress a palpable sense of loss of institutional
regard, loyalty, and self-respect”).
121. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 165 (arguing that congressional
incentive structure leads to “preference for one form of oversight over another, less-effective
form”).
122. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, at ix (1990) (“Congressional oversight activity has increased
dramatically since the early 1970s.”).
123. See Joel D. Aberbach, Changes in Congressional Oversight, 22 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 493, 493 (1979) (“Congress has shown increasing concern about oversight as the
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Understanding the complex motivations for congressional oversight
is important when one is negotiating or litigating with Congress. Most
of these functional rationales and incentives can be tethered to the
formal legal rationales: prospective legislation, present execution of law,
and government misconduct.124
However, some of them—like
transparency, adjudication interference, and rulemaking influence—are
harder to square with the Supreme Court’s vision of the constitutional
basis for oversight. As such, the next section addresses legal precedent
on the limits of congressional oversight.
4. Limits on Congressional Oversight
While Congress’s power to investigate is broad, it “is not
unlimited.”125 First, an oversight inquiry must be grounded in a
congressional effort to exercise its legislative function.126 The Court has
noted that “[n]o inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”127
Based on the legal precedents, two types of potential limitations
emerge: jurisdictional and relative. A jurisdictional limitation suggests
that the purpose of the inquiry itself either lacks proper congressional
authority or a valid constitutional rationale. Congressional oversight
power is “limited to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular
house ‘has jurisdiction’ and in respect of which it rightfully may take
other action.”128 For example, as noted in Watkins v. United States,129
Congress does not have “general authority to expose the private affairs
of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the
Congress.”130
In contrast, a relative limitation occurs when the purpose or subject
matter of the congressional inquiry is jurisdictionally sound but the
congressional need is insufficient to overcome countervailing interests in
federal bureaucracy has expanded in size and program initiation has passed to the executive
branch.”).
124. See supra Part II.B.2.
125. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
126. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176–77 (1927) (upholding investigation
where “the object of the investigation and of the effort to secure the witness’s testimony was
to obtain information for legislative purposes”).
127. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
128. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 170 (characterizing, with approval, the holding in Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)).
129. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
130. Id. at 187.
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confidentiality or other competing values. Relative limitations are
analytically messy. They involve weighing competing, often legitimate,
claims by Congress and the subject of its investigative request. They
also represent the vast majority of interbranch oversight disputes. Of
course, Congress’s litigation model envisions very little limitation on
oversight power, whereas everything—outside of a jurisdictional bar to
oversight—is subject to discussion and limitation in the executive
branch transactional model.131
a. Jurisdictional Limitations on Oversight
Jurisdictional limitations focus on the motives of Congress as they
relate to the powers granted to the three branches by the Constitution.
Could Congress investigate a function firmly committed to the judiciary
or Executive such that it had no plenary ability to legislate in that area?
Some precedent suggests the answer is no. For example, in Barenblatt v.
United States,132 the Court held:
Since Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it
may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into
matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the
other branches of the Government. Lacking the judicial power
given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are
exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant
the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive.133
Thus, Barenblatt suggests that congressional oversight, like the broader
legislative power, is limited in areas committed to the other branches by
the Constitution.
Some of the old oversight cases enforced such jurisdictional
limitations. In Kilbourn v. Thompson,134 the Supreme Court held that
Congress exceeded its authority when it directed a committee to
investigate a matter that was inherently judicial.135 Similarly, in Marshall
v. Gordon,136 the Supreme Court granted habeas relief for the district
attorney for the Southern District of New York (the forerunner to U.S.
attorney) because detention for contempt on the basis of an intemperate
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See infra Parts III.A–B.
360 U.S. 109 (1959).
Id. at 111–12.
103 U.S. 168 (1880).
Id. at 192–93.
243 U.S. 521 (1917).
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letter transcended the implied right to preserve the legislative process
and crossed into the judicial role of enforcement of general criminal
laws.137
However, as previously noted, oversight disputes routinely occur in
the absence of judicial involvement and are resolved informally.138
Jurisdictional arguments, even if conceptually sound, are nearly
impossible to enforce at the investigative initiation phase.139 Congress
does not have meaningful self-regulation, and unless things escalate to
the point of a criminal or civil contempt proceeding or a constitutional
crisis, it is unlikely that there will be any judicial involvement in a
jurisdictional determination.
Therefore, as a practical matter,
jurisdictional limitations are brought to bear on Congress in the same
manner as relative limitations: as a function of the resolve and leverage
of the resisting party.
For its part, the Executive seeks to enforce jurisdictional limits on
the scope of congressional oversight with only marginal results. For
example, one dispute related to a congressional request for documents
related to Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan’s service in the Executive
in an effort to ascertain whether she should recuse herself from
decisions on pending or potential litigation related to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly known as
Obamacare.140 In response, the Department of Justice expressed
“serious separation-of-powers concerns regarding this congressional
inquiry” because it could encroach on the Judicial Branch and its
“purpose . . . falls outside the scope of Congress’s oversight authority.”141
While the Justice Kagan documents implicate judicial interests, the
Executive also believes Congress has no jurisdictional power to

137. Id. at 530–32, 543–44 (reviewing historical instances of exercise of inherent
congressional contempt power and noting that in several instances “it would seem that the
difference between the legislative and the judicial power was also sometimes forgotten”).
138. See supra Part II.C.1.
139. In the judicial context, procedures exist to resolve jurisdictional issues at the
initiation phases of litigation. No such procedures exist in the congressional investigation
context, so an inquiry undertaken without constitutional power to do so will proceed
unchecked until it meets resistance by the Executive or, perhaps at a later crisis stage, the
judiciary.
140. See Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Lamar S. Smith,
Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 6, 2012).
141. Id. at 1.
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encroach on executive functions.142 According to the Reagan-era Office
of Legal Counsel, “Congress may not conduct investigative or oversight
inquiries for the purpose of managing executive branch agencies or for
directing the manner in which the Executive Branch interprets and
executes the law.”143
This perspective is hard to reconcile with the pronouncement in
Watkins v. United States144 that congressional oversight power
“encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws.”145 Further, it becomes readily apparent that the categorical
declaration by the Executive Branch relies on lines of demarcation that
are impossible to decipher with clarity. If a committee’s oversight effort
in a given case is designed to affect a particular policy, how can the
Executive Branch enforce whether the questions are designed to
influence executive branch behavior or inform other congressional
actors about policy choices? These are the type of political questions
that bedevil courts as they search for judicially manageable standards.
The epistemology of congressional oversight motivation, and its
expression, is amorphic.
Moreover, the Barenblatt formulation on exclusivity146 is easier to
recite than to apply due to the power-blending among the three
branches incident to the constitutional design. The Constitution does
not offer “a complete division of authority between the three
branches.”147 As Justice Jackson famously noted, the Constitution
“enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity.”148 Therefore, it can be analytically challenging to find
powers that can be properly characterized as “exclusive” to one branch.
One notable modern-era dispute between Congress and the White
House brings to light the challenges facing the Executive in raising
jurisdictional arguments.149
During President George W. Bush’s
142. See Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Exec.
Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 60 (1985).
143. Id.
144. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
145. Id. at 187.
146. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959).
147. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
148. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
149. See Assertion of Exec. Privilege Concerning the Dismissal and Replacement of
U.S. Att’ys, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3 (June 27, 2007) (Opinion of Paul D. Clement,
Solicitor General and Acting Attorney General).
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Administration, the House Committee on the Judiciary investigated the
forced resignation of nine U.S. Attorneys in late 2006.150 At the time,
Democratic Representative John Conyers chaired the committee.151
The matter involved the dismissal and replacement of several U.S.
Attorneys under the well-recognized presidential powers grounded in
the Appointments Clause.152 Under that Clause, subject to Senate
advice and consent, the President appoints U.S. Attorneys and has
independent power to remove them.153 There is no appreciable
constitutional role for the House in the appointment and removal of
U.S. Attorneys.154
The Executive asserted substantial Barenblatt
exclusivity arguments that failed to provide relief to the White House.155
As such, the Bush Administration challenged the committee’s
jurisdiction to peer into deliberations of an exclusive, core presidential
function.156 In recommending President Bush’s assertion of executive
privilege, Acting Attorney General Paul Clement argued that the
President’s power to remove presidentially appointed U.S. Attorneys
was exclusive to the President:
The Senate has the authority to approve or reject the
appointment of officers whose appointment by law requires the
advice and consent of the Senate (which has been the case for
U.S. Attorneys since the founding of the Republic), but it is for
the President to decide whom to nominate to such positions and
whether to remove such officers once appointed. . . .
Consequently, there is reason to question whether Congress has
oversight authority to investigate deliberations by White House
officials concerning proposals to dismiss and replace U.S.
Attorneys, because such deliberations necessarily relate to the
potential exercise by the President of an authority assigned to
him alone.157

150. Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2008).
151. Id. at 61.
152. Dismissal and Replacement, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2.
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
(holding that appointee removal power, outside of impeachment proceedings, is the exclusive
province of the President).
154. Impeachment power could be implicated but would not be a bar to a presidential
decision to remove U.S. Attorneys.
155. Dismissal and Replacement, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3.
156. See Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
157. Dismissal and Replacement, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3.
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The executive branch jurisdictional argument was rejected by the
district court in the resulting civil contempt litigation, Committee on the
Judiciary v. Miers.158 On interlocutory appeal, the D.C. Circuit granted
a stay, and the parties eventually settled the resulting civil contempt
litigation after the election of President Barack Obama.159 As a result,
no appellate court reviewed the district court’s rejection of a
jurisdictional challenge to the committee’s investigation.160
Courts may be predisposed to side with congressional advocates on
jurisdictional arguments because the concept of legislative purpose is
expansive. In a seminal work, James M. Landis argued: “It is true that
. . . a committee must proceed with a legislative aim in mind, but, in
determining whether it has so proceeded, inadequate conceptions of
legislative purposes may unduly limit the field of inquiry.”161 Further,
courts are generally inclined to defer to Congress as to its own
motivations.162

158. 558 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (suggesting that the Executive characterized the scope of the
investigation “far too narrowly” because it was “not merely an investigation into the
Executive’s use of his removal power but rather a broader inquiry into whether improper
partisan considerations have influenced prosecutorial discretion”). Broadening the justifying
investigative rationale to include prosecutorial discretion probably further disturbed an
Executive that believes such discretion, like removal power, is within its exclusive province.
159. See Agreement Concerning Accommodation, Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers,
No. 08-cv-00409-JDB (D.D.C. dismissed Oct. 23, 2009).
160. A previous congressional investigation into certain clemency decisions provides
another example of a jurisdictional argument advanced by the Executive. Attorney General
Janet Reno advised President Clinton that “it appears that Congress’ oversight authority does
not extend to the process employed in connection with a particular clemency decision, to the
materials generated or the discussions that took place as part of that process, or to the advice
or views the President received in connection with a clemency decision” because it is an
exclusively presidential power. Assertion of Exec. Privilege With Respect to Clemency
Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 3–4 (1999) (Opinion of Attorney General Janet Reno). That
dispute never reached the courts.
161. James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 194 (1926). The title is somewhat ironic in that
Professor Landis does not see much conceptual room for limits. Id. at 220. The thrust of his
argument is that Kilbourn v. Thompson was wrongly decided due to a superficially narrow
view of legislative power. See id. 214–20. Aside from acknowledging that there must be some
regulation external to Congress beyond “self-limitations inherent in the legislative process,”
see id. at 220, he contemplates neither potential scenarios in which jurisdiction could be
challenged successfully nor legitimate countervailing executive branch interests.
162. See id. at 218–19.
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b. Relative Limitations on Oversight
Most oversight disputes involve competing legitimate interests and
thus implicate relative, rather than jurisdictional, limitations on
Congress’s power of inquiry. The paradigmatic dispute over relative
limitation of oversight power occurs when Congress seeks information
that would reveal executive branch deliberative processes, but such
disputes may also arise if oversight activities affect other functions such
as adjudications, prosecutions, diplomatic communiqués, pardons, or
national security information. Presidential assertions of executive
privilege in the face of contempt citations capture the concept of
competing interests at the ultimate stage of conflict escalation.163
For example, in 2012, Chairman Issa requested documents from the
U.S. Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service seeking
information about certain regulations implementing the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, including predecisional legal
analysis of the proposed rules.164 In response, the Assistant Secretary of
Treasury for Legislative Affairs wrote:
In particular, you seek internal legal analysis and any other
related documents that predate the proposed rule. These
materials
implicate
longstanding
Executive
Branch
confidentiality interests. It is well-established that agency staff
and counsel must have the ability to . . . fulfill their statutory
responsibilities.
....
. . . Nonetheless, we recognize the important oversight role
of Congress, and we are committed to working with the
Committee to provide the information you need to fulfill that
role. Accordingly, we are prepared to meet with your staff to
discuss your particular oversight interests in this matter and to
explore ways that we can accommodate those interests, while still
protecting the important institutional interests described
above.165

163. The President may assert executive privilege on jurisdictional grounds, but the vast
majority of executive branch objections raise countervailing confidentiality concerns rather
than challenge congressional power to investigate a topic. Part V.A, infra, addresses law of
executive privilege.
164. See Letter from Alastair M. Fitzpayne, Assistant Sec’y of Legal Affairs, U.S. Dep’t
of Treasury, to Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform 1 (Oct.
25, 2012).
165. Id. at 2.
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There is no real question that the Oversight Committee has
jurisdiction to evaluate tax regulations, so the Treasury Department
raised no jurisdictional objection.166 Rather, it raised the concern that
compliance with the request would undermine executive branch policy
formulation policies.167 As discussed more fully in Part V, Congress
does not believe that deliberative process privilege is applicable to
oversight. Furthermore, as discussed in the following section, the
Treasury letter is a classic expression of the executive branch
transactional model of oversight.
In practice, both jurisdictional and relative limitations are almost
always functional rather than legal. Given the absence of pretrial
screening or discovery management in the judicial context, jurisdictional
and relative limitations take the form of arguments advanced by a party
resisting oversight. Moreover, the competing perspectives on the
Constitution—the congressional litigation model and the executive
transactional model—lead to vastly different conclusions as to whether
oversight power must yield to objections.
III. COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL VIEWS
This Article argues that Congress and the Executive operate with
fundamentally different views of the Constitution when it comes to
congressional oversight. Hierarchy and entitlement are the hallmarks of
the congressional litigation perspective.168 In contrast, equality and
accommodation characterize the Executive’s transactional model.169
This section provides a detailed description of each branch’s views.170 It
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See infra Part III.A.
169. See infra Part III.B.
170. When reviewing an early draft of this Article, Professor Christopher Green
observed a logical link between the competing models presented here and the models
outlined in Professors Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). In particular, they describe two
approaches to settlement negotiations: a “Strategic Model,” which is a “relatively norm-free
process centered on the transmutation of underlying bargaining strength into agreement by
the exercise of power, horse-trading, and bluff,” and a “Norm-Centered Model” which
focuses on “elements normally associated with adjudication—the parties and their
representatives would invoke rules, cite precedents, and engage in reasoned elaboration.” Id.
at 973 (quoting Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: DisputeSettlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976) (internal quotation mark
omitted)). Their models roughly track the ones described in this Article, where the NormCentered Model tracks Congress’s litigation model and the Strategic Model tracks the
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also includes congressional and executive authorities that betray the
respective litigation and transactional sensibilities that lead to ships
passing—or rather colliding—in the night.
A. The Congressional Litigation Model
Congress has adopted the language of criminal investigations and
civil litigation.
It initiates “investigations,”171 sends “document
172
requests,”
issues “subpoenas,”173 conducts “depositions,”174 holds
175
“hearings,” and finds “contempt.”176 Of late, some congressional
committees have sent “preservation letters”177 to executive branch
entities seeking to command them to preserve evidence notwithstanding

Executive’s transactional model. Their article also provides great insight into bargaining in a
legal regime with uncertain outcomes. See also Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks with Robert
Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (explaining trials as settlement bargaining failure and the relative
parties’ approach to risks that drive such failure).
171. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 41 (“Each . . .
committee may make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction . . . .”); HOUSE
COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 415 (“Each committee may conduct at
any time such investigations and studies as it considers necessary or appropriate in the
exercise of its responsibilities . . . .”).
172. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 41; HOUSE
COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 423.
173. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 41 (“Each
standing committee . . . is authorized . . . to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance
of . . . witnesses and the production of . . . correspondence, books, papers, and
documents . . . .”); HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 423 (“For
the purpose of carrying out any of its functions and duties . . . a committee or subcommittee is
authorized . . . to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such
witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers,
and documents as it considers necessary.”).
174. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 162–63
(authorizing the Special Committee on Aging “to take depositions and other testimony”);
HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 397 (“The Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform may adopt a rule authorizing and regulating the taking of
depositions by a member or counsel of the committee, including pursuant to subpoena under
clause 2(m) of rule XI . . . .”).
175. See HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 422
(establishing “[h]earing procedures”).
176. See id. (“The chair may punish breaches of order and decorum, and of professional
ethics on the part of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearings; and the committee
may cite the offender to the House for contempt.”).
177. See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, to John Koskinen, Comm’r, IRS (June 16, 2014).
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an existing statutory scheme of records preservation obligations under
the Federal Records Act178 and Presidential Records Act.179
Advocates of Congress begin with a premise of near unfettered
congressional power in this sphere, subject only to the narrowest of
exceptions. During his distinguished tenure with the Congressional
Research Service, Morton Rosenberg offered the quintessential
congressional formulation of oversight power:
Numerous Supreme Court precedents establish and support a
broad and encompassing power in the Congress to engage in
oversight and investigation that reaches all sources of
information that enable it to carry out its legislative function. In
the absence of a countervailing constitutional privilege or a selfimposed statutory restriction upon its authority, Congress and its
committees, have virtually, plenary power to compel information
needed to discharge its legislative function from executive
agencies, private persons and organizations, and within certain
constraints, the information so obtained may be made public.180
Thus, Congress starts from the premise that, as a function of its
position above the Executive in the oversight hierarchy, it is entitled to
any and all information. In the face of an objection, Congress will
consider whether a narrow exception, one recognized by Congress,
applies.
1. Hierarchy
Hierarchy characterizes Congress’s perspective on congressional
oversight. Congress believes, not unreasonably, that it has a supervisory
role over the Executive when exercising its oversight function.181
178. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3107 (2012).
179. Id. §§ 2201–2207 (2012).
180. MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL
INQUIRY 1 (1995).
181. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Consolidated (I) Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, and (II) Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion For
Summary Judgment, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder at 20, No. 12-cv-01332ABJ (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2014), ECF No. 69 (asserting that congressional authority “to oversee
the Executive Branch generally . . . is firmly rooted in Article I” of the U.S. Constitution).
The concept of such hierarchical superiority, i.e., “over,” is embedded in the term “oversight”
itself. ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 3 (“Experience has shown that in order to engage in
successful oversight, committees must establish their credibility with the executive
departments and agencies they oversee early, often, consistently, and in a manner that evokes
respect, if not fear.”). Congress could also point to the reverse asymmetry associated with
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Congressional advocates note that “Congress’ right of access to
executive branch information has been recognized by innumerable
Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions.”182 In a typical
assertion, one House committee chairman suggested that Congress’s
broad investigative mandate renders it “necessary . . . to have unfettered
access to executive branch information in order to be able to make
sound legislative judgments.”183
From the congressional perspective, top-line equality of the three
branches of the federal government does not equate to equality in every
interaction. Courts, like Congress, have inherent authority to supervise
their own proceedings,184 as well as to enforce their rules and orders.185
A litigation model presumes a hierarchy in which Congress is above the
Executive and in which the Executive is obligated to submit to
congressional investigative authority.186 The Executive would generally
concede that both congressional and executive officers must respect the
presiding authority of a federal judge in a criminal or civil case. For
purposes of a criminal proceeding, even though an Assistant United
States Attorney is an executive official representing executive branch
interests, the judge stands in a supervisory—and inherently

executive branch processes, such as criminal investigations or prosecutions of members of
Congress or agency hearings or other regulatory actions in which Congress seeks to
participate. But see id. at 65 (“The Executive Branch and Congress must seek to work
together as co-equal branches of government, and Congress must exercise its oversight
function even when its leadership comes from the same political party as the President.”
(emphasis added)).
182. ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 2.
183. H.R. REP. NO. 106-130, pt. 1, at 40 (1999) (expressing the additional views of
Chairman Porter J. Goss, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of
Representatives, on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000).
184. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–45 (1991) (affirming inherent
power of federal courts to manage their own proceedings and to control the conduct of those
who appear before them); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1459 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(“The court’s supervisory power . . . exists principally to allow the court to protect the
integrity of the judicial process and to deter government misconduct.”), overruled on other
grounds, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
185. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987)
(“The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that
the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on
other Branches.”).
186. In litigation, adversaries share baseline equality, but both submit to the
hierarchical authority of the judge. Congress sees its own role as presiding forum for
oversight proceedings in the mode of a judge.

918

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:881

hierarchical—role with respect to the judicial proceeding.187 That judge
expects an executive official to abide by court rules and orders.188 A
judge could sanction a federal prosecutor189 or executive branch party
litigant190 for obstruction, delay, or misconduct, including a finding of
criminal contempt.191
Congress believes it is entitled to the same sort of interbranch
submission to congressional authority in its oversight proceedings.192
Congress sees it as an affront that the Executive would micromanage
congressional proceedings by attempting to substitute alternative
witnesses, sources of information, scopes of request, or forms of

187. Some courts characterize regulation of federal prosecutors in criminal proceedings
as grounded in their capacity as officers of the court. See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1453–54
(“When a court regulates a prosecutor’s ethical conduct, it regulates the prosecutor in his
capacity as an officer of the court and thus there is no threat to the principle of separation of
powers.”). From this perspective, they are regulated in a judicial, Article III role rather than
their status as executive officers, and thornier separation of powers questions may be
sidestepped. Cf. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (“[A] federal
court ‘may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress.’ Nevertheless, it is well established that ‘[e]ven a sensible and
efficient use of the supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or
statutory provisions.’” (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985))).
However, courts also expect executive branch clients to submit to judicial power to regulate
Article III proceedings.
188. See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1455 (holding that the U.S. Attorney General’s
argument that federal prosecutors are exempt from local federal rules governing ethical
conduct would arrogate essential judicial power and, as such, violate separation of powers).
189. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 262–63 (discussing sanctions available to
federal courts to address misconduct by federal prosecutors, including an order to a
prosecutor to show cause why she should not be disciplined, referral to a bar or the U.S.
Department of Justice for investigation, or a finding of contempt of court for a Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure Rule 6 violation of grand jury secrecy); see also United States v.
Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1993) (“We have recognized that exercise of supervisory
powers is an appropriate means of policing ethical misconduct by prosecutors.” (citations
omitted)); United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Under some
circumstances, it may be appropriate to hold an Assistant [United States Attorney] in
contempt of court.”).
190. See Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reversing, on the
merits, findings of contempt against senior executive officials in the Department of the
Interior, including the Secretary, for alleged misconduct as party litigants, but assuming that
such a finding could be proper if warranted).
191. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a) (setting forth the procedures for criminal contempt); see
also Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1464 (“[H]olding the prosecutor in contempt . . . can be adequate to
discipline and punish government attorneys who attempt to circumvent the standards of their
profession.”).
192. See, e.g., Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 1.
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production based on executive branch presumptions about Congress’s
legitimate interests.193
2. Entitlement
Entitlement in a litigation model captures the concept of fixed rights
to information. Congress believes it is entitled to virtually any executive
branch information, on Congress’s timetable, absent a valid, formal
assertion of executive privilege.194 A recent formulation of the
congressional view can be found in Chairman Issa’s response to
President Obama’s assertion of executive privilege in the Fast and
Furious investigation:
Courts have consistently held that the assertion of the
constitutionally-based executive privilege—the only privilege
that ever can justify the withholding of documents from a
congressional committee by the Executive Branch—is only
applicable with respect to documents and communications that
implicate the confidentiality of the President’s decision-making
process, defined as those documents and communications to and
from the President and his most senior advisors. Even then, it is
a qualified privilege that is overcome by a showing of the
committee’s need for the documents.195
Congressional advocates also categorically reject many objections raised
about oversight information requests on the grounds that they fall
outside such narrow exceptions.196
The role of precedent also tends to take on more importance in a
litigation model. If one’s view of congressional oversight power is that
of an immutable and inherent entitlement to executive branch
information, establishing a precedent of action demonstrates a tangible
example of such entitlement that should govern prospective
interactions. For example, Congress obtained access to one of the
President’s daily intelligence briefings (PDB)197 in connection with the
9/11 Commission,198 creating a sense of entitlement to any subsequent
193. See, e.g., id. at 1, 6.
194. See, e.g., id. at 1.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., id. at 4.
197. The President’s morning intelligence products usually come in the form of a PDB
document.
198. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, was a congressional, Article I, entity; its
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PDB. Congressional actors believe the Executive expects them to
assume the role of the modern-day Sisyphus, pushing today’s boulder of
oversight requests up (from) the Hill only to have it roll back down to
be repeated tomorrow in a perpetual spirit-crushing exercise.
In the eyes of Congress, there are congressional rules that must be
followed, document requests that should be answered, subpoenas that
must be satisfied, and witnesses that must appear. As such, executive
targets of congressional oversight requests face the binary status of
compliance or noncompliance.
To Congress, noncompliance by
executive officials eventually amounts to the crime of contempt.
B. The Executive Branch Transactional Model
The Executive’s transactional model envisions oversight as a
negotiation process between two interested parties with compelling sets
of interests that, when in conflict, must be resolved on the basis of the
force of reason and bargaining leverage. Transactional models reject
the binary in-compliance/out-of-compliance perspective Congress brings
to its information requests. Rather, the Executive believes that
congressional information needs must be weighed against executive
confidentiality interests. From the perspective of the White House,
congressional information needs can often be satisfied in a number of
ways. Given the equality of the parties and the legitimate concerns
implicated by certain requests, the Executive Branch sees no
presumptive congressional right to define the manner, form, quantity, or
messenger of the information to be provided.
To the Executive, the role of precedent is persuasive rather than
determinative, much as it is in a business transaction. For example, the
price a purchasing company pays for assets valued at $x of a debt-ridden
party yesterday would likely be quite different than the purchase of the
same assets, still valued at $x, owned by a target company with no
pressing need or inclination to sell.

information requests of the Executive were therefore congressional oversight requests from
an analytical, separation of powers perspective. See Daniel Marcus, The 9/11 Commission
and the White House: Issues of Executive Privilege and Separation of Powers, 1 AM. U. NAT’L
SECURITY L. BRIEF 19, 19–21 (2011). In the highly politically charged aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, the White House acquiesced to 9/11 Commission requests for PDB material. See,
e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 261 (2004) (discussing relevant PDB materials provided to the
Commission).
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The transactional model also does not contemplate a neutral third
party as the arbiter of the price and terms of the interaction. There is a
premium on leverage and self-help within the negotiation process—a
process the Executive believes the Constitution requires. A court ruling
could short-circuit a present negotiation and may also establish fixed
rights for future interactions, which the Executive believes could do
violence to separation of powers.
One of the most influential recitations of the transactional
perspective held by the Executive Branch was set forth in President
Ronald Reagan’s November 4, 1982, memorandum issuing guidance
about congressional oversight requests:
The policy of this Administration is to comply with
Congressional requests for information to the fullest extent
consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the
Executive Branch. . . . [E]xecutive privilege will be asserted only
in the most compelling circumstances, and only after careful
review demonstrates that assertion of the privilege is necessary.
Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the
Executive Branch have minimized the need for invoking executive
privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should continue as
the primary means of resolving conflicts between the Branches.199
As such, in stark contrast to the binary congressional perspective,
the Executive views negotiation between co-equals and accommodation
among those parties as the mother’s milk of congressional oversight. As
articulated by President Reagan’s Attorney General William French
Smith, “The accommodation required is not simply an exchange of
concessions or a test of political strength. It is an obligation of each
branch to make a principled effort to acknowledge, and if possible to
meet, the legitimate needs of the other branch.”200
1. Equality
The Executive does not accept the premise that it is a subordinate
party in matters of congressional oversight. Rather, like a business
transaction, the Executive views the parties as normative equals at arm’s

199. Memorandum from President Ronald Reagan for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests
for Information 1 (Nov. 4, 1982) (emphasis added).
200. Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 31
(1981).
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length. Accordingly, executive oversight responses often emphasize the
“co-equality” of the branches in order to establish the legitimacy of
resistance.201
From an executive perspective, the equality principle also embeds a
concept of branch autonomy articulated in Nixon v. Fitzgerald202: “The
essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent
functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned
sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or
intimidation by other branches.”203 Thus, congressional pretention to
unfettered access to executive information, as well as dictation of terms
of such access, amounts to undue interference by a peer.
2. Accommodation
Accommodation in a transactional model relates to the method of
outcome determination, but it flows from a view of constitutional
design.204 Whereas Congress seeks to enforce a rule of entitlement, the
Executive believes both branches share competing, legitimate
interests.205 Thus, oversight dispute outcomes, like transactions, are
primarily defined by the relative leverage possessed by each party in a
given situation. As a result, the parties’ interaction consists primarily of
negotiation.
In 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice communicated formal views
on its obligations with respect to congressional oversight in connection
with a House subcommittee hearing.206 In that letter, Assistant
Attorney General Robert Raben explained the Executive’s protective
goals: “In implementing the longstanding policy of the Executive
Branch to comply with Congressional requests for information to the
fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations
201. Of course, Congress also invokes its “coequal” status when it believes it is being
stonewalled by the Executive.
202. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
203. Id. at 760–61 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
204. See Neal Devins, Congressional–Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111–16 (1996) (a section titled “The
Competing Interests of Congress and the Executive”).
205. Id. at 113–14; see also Assertion of Exec. Privilege Over Commc’ns Regarding
EPA’s Ozone Air Quality Standards and Cal.’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op.
Att’y Gen., slip op. at 3–5 (June 19, 2008) (opinion of Att’y Gen. Michael Mukasey)
(assessing if the Committee’s need for the subpoenaed documents overcomes the executive
privilege).
206. See Assistant Att’y Gen. Raben Letter to Chairman Linder, supra note 72, at 2–3.
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of the Executive Branch, the Department’s goal in all cases is to satisfy
legitimate legislative interests while protecting Executive Branch
confidentiality interests.”207 As noted, the letter is consistent with
executive branch policy in administrations of both political parties
dating back at least as far as President Reagan.208
The Department’s rhetorical use of “interests” is a form of resistance
to a notion of congressional entitlement. A concept of competing
interests flows from the equality principle and embeds within it the
legitimacy of executive branch concerns. In stark contrast to a Congress
entitled to almost anything subject only to the narrowest of exceptions,
the Executive envisions the Constitution as requiring the balancing of
interests. Under this view, the Constitution requires the Executive to
provide sufficient information to Congress for legislative purposes,
subject to executive branch interests in confidentiality or other
processes that may determine the time, manner, and scope of
information provided.
Furthermore, an accommodation process requires weighing
competing interests and relative merits, and thus requires an assessment
not just of executive branch interests but also of their merit vis-à-vis
congressional need for the information. A number of factors naturally
come into play:
• the legitimacy and gravity of congressional need for the requested
information;
• whether the request for the information is tailored to that need;
• the legitimacy and gravity of executive branch confidentiality
interests implicated by the request;
• the ability to satisfy legitimate congressional needs with refined
or narrowed requests;
• the availability of alternative sources of the requested
information;
• historical practice, by both branches, with respect to similar
requests; and
• the respective political will and leverage of the branches to pursue
their positions.

207. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
208. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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This list is descriptive in that it resembles executive branch analysis
in practice. It also has normative value. Sensitive consideration of these
factors should result in optimal congressional oversight activity while
protecting executive branch interests. However, who evaluates these
factors, and by what mechanism, remains problematic in terms of
separation of powers. The question is whether this is a matter for the
political processes, the courts, or both.
C. The Two Models: Self-Serving and Inapt
Congress and the Executive derive great benefits that flow naturally
from their respective models of choice. Both models, however, fall short
of their adopted analogy—whether litigation or transactional
negotiation—in material respects. Specifically, Congress, in acting as
both an adversarial party and the arbiter in its own investigations, has
failed to adopt procedural safeguards that are present in court, such as
supervised discovery and protection of otherwise confidential
information. In contrast, the Executive transactional model provides for
no arbiter at all, allowing the Executive to entrench itself when it holds
the information Congress seeks.
1. Litigation Model Benefits to Congress and Analogy Weaknesses
Politically, Congress derives great benefit from its association with
litigation by framing disputes with private parties and the Executive in
the language of “compliance” or “non-compliance.” By the time the
Executive raises an objection to a congressional request, the press
invariably frames the resulting stories the way Congress would like: as a
“failure to comply” with a congressional request, or, even worse, a
subpoena.209 Thus, from the first sign that the Executive may have
objections to the scope or nature of the inquiry, whether legitimate or
meritless, it is cast in a light that suggests lawlessness and wrongdoing.210
The resulting political pressure caused by this negative frame also assists
Congress in dislodging information from an Executive that benefits
from inaction.211
However, while Congress cloaks itself in the language of litigation
and investigations, it has little respect for the procedural safeguards that

209. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 809–10.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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courts have developed over centuries to bolster legitimacy.212 In fact, it
has failed to create procedural opportunities to obtain relief for unduly
burdensome requests, failed to establish meaningful privacy and nondisclosure principles, and demonstrated hostility to common law
privileges. Moreover, Congress has failed to create any internal process
for a neutral, or at least removed, arbiter to review objections raised by
its discovery targets. Instead, the chair of the relevant congressional
committee rules on motions, notwithstanding the fact that the chair is
often in a fundamentally adversarial posture to a witness or agency.
Some procedural disparities derive from the fact that a legislative
inquiry has a purpose other than the resolution of a case or controversy.
The courts are quite clear that congressional investigations are not the
same as criminal adjudications.213 However, interests in reputation,214
procedural fairness,215 and public legitimacy216 apply in full force. Thus,
while Congress’s information gathering threatens concrete harms to
individuals and entities, they are not entitled to “the full panoply” of
procedural protections.217
The congressional litigation model also differs from real litigation in
that it lacks any meaningful supervision of the discovery process. The
American civil litigation discovery process already honors incredibly
intrusive requests and costly information production.218 In fact, most
countries with civil law traditions look upon our system of civil
discovery with contempt due to what they see as litigation run amok.219
212. I address Congress’s lack of procedural safeguards and offer potential reform
principles designed to bolster congressional oversight legitimacy in a subsequent draft article
entitled Congressional Due Process. As discussed there, both government officials and
private parties confront spartan procedural protections in congressional investigations. For
purposes of this Article, it is important to note that at the time of requested enforcement, a
congressional subpoena or contempt finding has not likely undergone any meaningful preenforcement supervision or review.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting that a
congressional inquiry is “an investigative proceeding and not a criminal proceeding”).
214. See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 118 (1963) (recognizing reputational
interests in connection with a congressional hearing by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities).
215. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
216. See, e.g., Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the
Exec. Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 61 (1985).
217. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
219. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on
Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 77 (1994) (“Foreign courts
usually regard U.S. discovery requests as impermissibly broad and . . . refuse to execute such
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As a result, many of them fail to honor our transnational discovery
requests.220 By comparison, congressional discovery is vastly more
unregulated and sprawling than even the civil litigation discovery
process.
In traditional civil litigation, the parties have numerous
opportunities to register their objections to discovery requests.221 More
importantly, they have procedures in place for review. Under certain
circumstances, civil litigants may seek interlocutory appeal in an effort
to shield especially sensitive information from disclosure in the
discovery context.222 Similarly, discovery is regulated in federal criminal
investigations by means of various constitutional safeguards related to
search and seizure, interrogations and confessions, and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.223
In addition to an unsupervised discovery process, congressional
investigations also offer little meaningful privacy or non-disclosure
protections for those from whom it seeks information. While there is a
general presumption of a public right to observe court proceedings,224
civil litigation includes procedural opportunities for litigants to seek
protection from public disclosure for certain cognizable protected
interests.225 Congress, however, does not offer enforceable protections
for trade secrets or otherwise confidential information taken into its
custody.
Putting aside whether procedural safeguards or substantive
privileges are available, if Congress refuses to yield, the issues are not
going to be resolved until well after a party resisting oversight is in
requests.” (footnote omitted)); Marat A. Massen, Note, Discovery for Foreign Proceedings
After Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices: A Critical Analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Jurisprudence,
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 877 (2010) (observing that “many civil law nations find America’s
discovery system to be intrusive and fundamentally inconsistent with their own”).
220. See, e.g., Born, supra note 219, at 77.
221. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4).
222. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1918) (holding that a subpoenaed
party may obtain an interlocutory appeal on refusal based on a claim of privilege if she
stipulates she will comply with the court order upon a final adjudication).
223. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 41.
224. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
225. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a presumption against
including Social Security numbers, birth dates, taxpayer identification numbers, minors’
names, or a financial account number in any filing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a) (“Privacy
Protection for Filings Made with the Court”). It also authorizes a court, “for good cause,” to
enforce a protective order requiring redactions or limiting a nonparty’s access to information.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e) (“Protective Orders”).
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serious legal jeopardy. In a congressional investigation, objections
related to discovery, protection of confidential information, and
production of privileged information will not get reviewed by a neutral
party until they are raised as a defense to a criminal contempt
prosecution, a defense to civil contempt litigation, or on a writ of habeas
corpus following an inherent contempt finding.
The Speech and Debate Clause226 presents one of the principal
complicating factors for subjects of congressional oversight. Specifically,
it grants absolute immunity to congressional actors whose conduct is
undertaken in furtherance of legislative functions.227 As evidenced by
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund,228
immunity frustrates any judicial regulation of congressional discovery
process either by means of a suit to enjoin or other litigation platform
designed to quash a congressional subpoena.229
The D.C. Circuit commented on the lack of discovery management
in congressional investigations some fifty years ago in Tobin v. United
States.230 The dispute involved the withholding of documents by the
Executive Director of the Port of New York Authority, at the direction
of the Governors of New York and New Jersey, on grounds that the
scope of the congressional subpoena was overbroad.231 The court
lamented that this discovery issue had to be resolved in the context of a
criminal contempt prosecution.232 The court’s concern stemmed from
the fact that a witness cannot receive a determination of his
constitutional rights until he is subjected to criminal prosecution. As
such, the Tobin court recommended Congress create a method for
allowing these determinations to be made prior to contempt by way of
declaratory judgment. Because no such method has been adopted,

226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
227. Id.
228. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
229. Id. at 511.
230. 306 F.2d 270, 275–76 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
231. Id. at 271.
232. Id. at 276 (“Although this question is not before the Court, it does feel that if
contempt is, indeed, the only existing method, Congress should consider creating a method of
allowing these issues to be settled by declaratory judgment. Even though it may be
constitutional to put a man to guessing how a court will rule on difficult questions like those
raised in good faith in this suit, what is constitutional is not necessarily most desirable.
Especially where the contest is between different governmental units, the representative of
one unit in conflict with another should not have to risk jail to vindicate his constituency’s
rights.” (quoting United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 617 (D.D.C. 1961))).
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however, contempt proceedings remain the sole process to secure a
determination by a neutral arbiter. Though the Tobin court ultimately
reversed the judgment of conviction,233 relief is rare for a person who
decides to risk the consequences of noncompliance.234
Lack of management of congressional discovery represents obvious
criminal peril for a private individual or non-federal entity. In
interbranch disputes, unbridled discovery takes on a separation of
powers dimension. The Supreme Court recognized, in Cheney v. U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia,235 a nexus between the
crafting of discovery requests and separation of powers.236 Specifically,
in Cheney, the Court compared “overly broad discovery requests” in
civil litigation to the “narrow subpoena orders” in United States v.
Nixon.237 It noted that, in Nixon, the “very specificity of the subpoena
requests serve[d] as an important safeguard against unnecessary
intrusion into the operation of the Office of the President.”238 While the
calculus of sufficient showings may be different in the congressional
oversight context, the scope of a discovery request clearly relates to the
relative burden on the Executive.
Finally, it bears mention that not all congressional actors share a
sincere belief in the litigation model. Congress is defined by its
multipolarity. Some congressional actors adopt the litigation model as a
negotiating tactic. In other words, they use the language of litigation,
authority, entitlement, and outrage in order to increase the political
pressure on the other side of the constitutional negotiation.
2. Transactional Model Benefits to the Executive and Analogy
Weaknesses
The Executive Branch benefits from adopting the transactional
model in a number of important respects. First, the party with the
advantage in the status quo ante will prevail in the event of inaction. In
the congressional oversight and investigations context, the Executive
233. Id.
234. Yellin v. United States is another such scarce example in which the Court offered a
defendant rare relief by excusing the failure to answer questions on the grounds that the
congressional subcommittee at issue failed to follow its own rules on executive session. 374
U.S. 109, 122 (1963).
235. 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
236. See id. at 387.
237. Id. at 386.
238. Id. at 387.
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Branch resisting production of information will prevail when there is
stalemate. A transactional model inherently challenges congressional
authority by means of its claim of equality and functionally limits the
scope of congressional oversight by framing conflicts as competing,
legitimate interests. By rejecting an imperative obligation to comply
with congressional subpoenas, the Executive Branch favors inaction and
delay such that a subpoena becomes a form of constitutional negotiation
rather than a categorical imperative. In this way, everything is up for
discussion.
The executive branch transactional model breaks down in that it
does not contemplate any role for judicial review. A pure transactional
model does not provide sufficient incentive for the Executive to
cooperate with politically embarrassing or functionally burdensome
oversight requests that are nevertheless legitimate. Moreover, executive
branch intransigence, whether principled or not, incurs costs to public
confidence in the government.
While judicial involvement is rare and problematic, it is an everpresent possibility should the Executive overplay its hand—or perhaps
even if it does not. Furthermore, the courts are likely to be much less
skeptical of congressional authority than the Executive. Without a
judicial Sword of Damocles overhead, there might not be enough
incentive to negotiate in good faith as the Executive would like to
suggest.
3. Escalation into Constitutional Conflict
In practice, oversight disputes are initially raised informally by
means of conference calls and letter exchanges. Generally, during such
a conversation, an executive branch representative may raise
confidentiality interests that could be damaged by the nature or scope of
a congressional oversight request. From its own perspective, “Executive
Branch confidentiality interests” is shorthand for a position that (a) has
likely been vetted through the Office of Legal Counsel as an Executive
Branch-wide position and (b) could be grounds for an assertion of
executive privilege. Executive branch officials are sensitive to the fact
that assertion of executive privilege is a power that belongs to the
President alone.239 However, many congressional staffers are either
unaware of, or find it tactically advantageous to ignore, that fact.
239. See, e.g., Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Prosecutorial
Documents, 25 Op. Att’y Gen., slip op. at 2 (Dec. 10, 2001).
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In turn, congressional staff will usually ask questions designed to pin
down the executive branch position as a flat refusal. The following are
cross-examination-style questions of the kind typical in oversight
disputes:
“Does that mean the Department is refusing the Chairman’s
request?”
“Will the Department honor the Chairman’s subpoena?”
“Is the Administrator aware that it is a crime to be held in contempt
of Congress?”
“Is the Administration asserting Executive Privilege?”
For the executive branch representative, these questions are traps.
If the answer is “yes” to executive privilege, then the official has
usurped a presidential prerogative. If the answer is “no,” it will provide
Congress with an opportunity to view the dispute as ripe for escalation
to the next relevant formal step: from document request, to subpoena
threat, to subpoena issuance, to contempt threat, to contempt hearing,
and, finally, to contempt vote. As the holder of the status quo, the
Executive Branch does not benefit from rapid escalation.
Correspondence and communication regularly starts from the premise
of meeting Congress’s legitimate information needs but with
counterproposals that are acceptable to the Executive.
From the congressional side, members of Congress are trying to get
the answers and information they want.
Depending on the
circumstances, the congressional committee may see benefits in a public
process fight with the Executive Branch in terms of publicity, interest
group perception, or political advantage. Congressional staff members
tend to frame questions that call for “yes” or “no” answers in crossexamination style. That the Executive wants to provide nuance belies
the divergent views of the branches.
Given the vast chasm between the branches in the nature of their
constitutional roles, the salient question then becomes: In the event of
impasse, how should such issues be resolved? The next section of the
Article addresses Congress’s potential remedies to vindicate its
oversight interests.
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT DISPUTES: REMEDIAL ANALYSIS
Professor Caprice Roberts, a remedies and federal courts scholar,
frequently invokes the maxim that remedies shape substantive rights.240
Remedies used to resolve interbranch oversight disputes not only favor
one of the competing models—congressional litigation or executive
transactional—but also shape branch relations in the constitutional
scheme. Therefore, appropriate remedial schemes must be very
carefully applied so as to create the right incentives and outcomes over
time. This section considers a number of formal and informal potential
congressional oversight enforcement remedies.
A. Potential Oversight Remedial Schemes
Congress has a range of potential remedies it can seek to enforce its
oversight prerogatives. The first set of remedial schemes to consider is
contempt, which comes in three varieties: inherent contempt power,
criminal contempt prosecutions, and civil contempt actions. Contempt
is defined as “willful disobedience to or open disrespect of a court,
judge, or legislative body.”241 The contempt approach is germane in that
the enforcement effort implicates the substance or process of the
congressional investigation itself.242 In the early days of the Republic,
the Supreme Court recognized contempt power as necessary to shield
Congress from being “exposed to every indignity and interruption that
rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may mediate against it.”243
The second set of remedial schemes available to Congress is use of
its other constitutional and functional powers to vindicate its oversight
interests.
Congress may use legislative authorizations and
appropriations as leverage against the Executive Branch to obtain
requested information. The Senate may use its advice and consent
power to hold up executive nominations to departments or agencies that
are resisting congressional oversight requests. Ultimately, Congress
could invoke its impeachment power to enforce its oversight
prerogatives. Such congressional self-help remedies have the benefit of
being within the control of Congress itself. However, such actions have

240. Caprice L. Roberts, Teaching Remedies from Theory to Practice, 57 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 713, 722 (2013).
241. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 269 (11th ed. 2011).
242. As will be seen below, some other potential remedial schemes are non-germane.
See infra Part IV.
243. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821).
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a weaker nexus to the oversight process in dispute, and that lack of
germaneness tends to increase the political costs to Congress because
other policy priorities are obstructed in the name of a congressional
investigation.
Contempt and congressional self-help remedies serve valid purposes;
however, there is a critical, and often overlooked, distinction between
congressional oversight activities directed at the Executive and activities
directed at private parties.244 Though inherent and criminal contempt
may be appropriate for recalcitrant private parties, the nature of
separation of powers suggests that contempt and self-help remedies be
used to address interbranch disputes. The following sections analyze the
appropriateness of contempt and self-help remedies in such disputes.
1. Contempt
One method by which Congress can regulate its own proceedings is
through the use of its contempt power. Contempt comes in three forms:
inherent, criminal, and civil. One important distinction between the
various types to keep in mind is the level of participation required by
other branches for Congress to exercise its contempt power.
a. Inherent Contempt
Inherent contempt only requires action on the part of Congress
itself.245 Under this approach, Congress directs the Sergeant-at-Arms to
bring a person before the Senate or House for trial.246 If convicted,
Congress can impose a prison sentence for coercive247 or punitive248
purposes. A person imprisoned by Congress may still avail herself of a
writ of habeas corpus to challenge the validity of the detention in
court.249
As late as 1977, one court noted that inherent contempt power has
the benefit of avoiding the type of dilemma Congress faces when

244. There are other entities that could fall within the oversight gaze, including state
and local governments, the judiciary, or international organizations subsidized by the United
States.
245. See ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 15 (“Unlike criminal and civil contempt
proceedings, Congress’ inherent contempt power may be used without the cooperation or
assistance of either the executive or judicial branches.”).
246. Id. at 14.
247. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 162 (1927).
248. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147–48 (1935).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012).
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seeking executive participation in prosecuting executive branch
officials.250 Inherent contempt allows Congress to retain control of the
entire enforcement process.251
The House of Representatives . . . retains its inherent power to
enforce its own subpoena duces tecum against any resistance or
reluctance to comply with it, by means of civil contempt
proceedings and remedies within its own forum. Such a
procedure might relieve the judiciary from any further
involvement in this matter. That procedure might also avoid
potential conflicts between the legislative and executive
branches, and within the executive branch itself, that would
result from a prosecution by the executive branch, of an
executive branch official, for conduct in accordance with
executive branch policy which the House of Representatives
might deem contempt of its legislative prerogative and
authority.252
While the D.C. District Court does a nice job of articulating
congressional–executive awkwardness presented by the use of criminal
contempt in an interbranch dispute,253 it fails to recognize the specter of
interbranch violence.
To say the least, it would be impractical and unwise for
congressional security forces to attempt to detain executive branch
officials and haul them off to the congressional brig,254 although
commentators occasionally call for it.255 One can see the momentary
attraction to inherent contempt from the vantage point of a frustrated
congressional stakeholder who, in the face of perceived non-compliance
with legitimate congressional requests, encounters an Executive Branch

250. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1308 (M.D. Fla.
1977).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
254. See Adam Cohen, Op-Ed., Congress Has a Way of Making Witnesses Speak: Its
Own Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A34 (discussing the Capitol Jail facility).
255. See Jon Ponder, Jail Cells in U.S. Capitol Building Could be Reopened for Rove,
Miers and Bolten, PENSITO REV. (July 26, 2007), http://www.pensitoreview.com/2007/07/26/jai
l-cells-in-us-capitol-building-available-for-rove-miers/, archived at http://perma.cc/W5JEEBGP (“Perhaps it is time for Congress to dust off its rusty inherent contempt power, reopen
the Capitol hoosegow, get some of the Capitol Police’s finest, and put a couple of people
behind bars for a few days.” (quoting congressional scholar Norm Ornstein) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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that refuses to prosecute its own under the congressional contempt
statute, and federal courts that resist judicial enforcement.
However, as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine the Executive
Branch standing idly by as congressional security forces seek forcible
detention of a cabinet official. The Executive Branch has more guns. It
would be incredibly damaging to the constitutional scheme if we
incentivized even the specter of violence between the political branches.
But inherent contempt would require that we jump to such vulgar
considerations almost immediately. Any constitutional avoidance
doctrine that contemplates police power that is divided by branch, at
cross-purposes, is therefore of little value.
Such considerations likely led the court in Miers to suggest that the
congressional arrest of a senior presidential advisor would be
particularly inappropriate.256 In contrast, while it has fallen out of
Congress’s favor,257 use of inherent contempt procedure against a
private party raises no such concerns because the federal government’s
monopoly—and unity—of police power is not threatened.
b. Criminal Contempt
Criminal contempt actions require the participation of all three
branches of government. Under this approach, Congress formally finds
an individual in contempt of Congress. Then, Congress refers the
person to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia for criminal
prosecution under the criminal contempt statute.258 At that point, the
resulting proceeding takes on the character of any criminal prosecution
conducted in Article III courts.
While this is a perfectly workable regime when the individual held in
contempt is a non-federal party, it is problematic as applied to
interbranch oversight disputes. Congress believes that the criminal
contempt remedy is wholly applicable in this context. In fact, since
Watergate, a component of Congress259 has cited thirteen senior
executive branch officials for contempt under a threat of criminal

256. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 92 (D.D.C. 2008).
257. See S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 97 (1977) (describing Congress’s inherent contempt
remedy as “time consuming and not very effective”).
258. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2012) (imposing a “duty” on the U.S. Attorney to “bring the
matter before the grand jury for its action”).
259. “Component” means a subcommittee, full committee, or an entire chamber.
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sanction.260 Accordingly, Congress expects the U.S. Attorney for the
District of Columbia to initiate prosecutions against other executive
branch officials held in contempt even though that prosecutor is a
subordinate of the President and even when the President asserted
executive privilege.261
Nevertheless, the Executive will not prosecute an executive branch
official acting pursuant to an assertion of executive privilege.262 The
Department of Justice, which has taken this position since at least
1956,263 has two principal reasons. First, according to the Department,
the executive branch official has not committed a crime if acting
pursuant to the assertion of privilege.264 Second, Congress may not
command an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is an executive
branch function.265 In line with this position, the Department of Justice
declined to prosecute executive branch officials subject to privilege
assertions who were held in contempt findings under President George

260. The officials are Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1975); Secretary of Commerce
Rogers C.B. Morton (1975); Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph A. Califano,
Jr. (1978); Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan (1980); Secretary of Energy James B.
Edwards (1981); Secretary of the Interior James Watt (1982); Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford (1983); Attorney General William French
Smith (1983); White House Counsel John M. Quinn (1996); Attorney General Janet Reno
(1998); White House Counsel Harriet Miers (2008); White House Chief of Staff Joshua
Bolten (2008); and Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. (2012). KAISER ET AL., supra note
49, at 34 n.57 (noting the first twelve contempt citations). The Holder civil litigation is
parallel to a criminal contempt referral, and Attorney General Holder was the thirteenth
executive branch official cited for congressional contempt.
261. See, e.g., Letter from Kerry W. Kircher, Gen. Counsel, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Att’y for the District of Columbia (July 26,
2012) (questioning whether Mr. Machen will “proceed as required by Section 194” to bring
Attorney General Holder’s contempt of Congress before the grand jury).
262. See, e.g., Prosecution for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Official Who Has
Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 140 (1984).
263. See Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 84th Cong. 2933 (1956) (in
which Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers testified that where a President asserted
privilege, the contempt of Congress statute was “inapplicable to the executive departments”).
264. See Prosecution for Contempt, 8 Op. O.L.C. at 140.
265. For a fulsome academic treatment that leads to the Department’s position, see
Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563 (1991) (arguing that Congress cannot mandate prosecutions and that
criminal contempt prosecutions of executive branch officials would unconstitutionally impede
executive branch functions).
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W. Bush266 and President Barack Obama.267 Due to this legal impasse,
which is another expression of the incompatible oversight models,
criminal contempt is not a means by which Congress can vindicate its
oversight interests vis-à-vis the Executive Branch.268
c.

Civil Contempt

Civil contempt actions require the participation of two branches of
the federal government: Congress and the judiciary. In light of
problems applying inherent and criminal contempt to interbranch
disputes, over the last decade Congress has turned to civil contempt
procedures in an effort to obtain judicial enforcement of its subpoenas
against the Executive.
The Senate and House have separate civil contempt procedures.
The Senate has a statute conferring authority on the federal courts to
issue an order commanding a person to comply with a Senate
subpoena.269 The procedure thereby allows the Senate to hold persons
in contempt, utilizing Article III court proceedings as the means of
enforcement. Since 1979, the Senate has authorized Senate Legal
Counsel to seek judicial enforcement of a document subpoena six times,
none of which have been directed against executive branch officials.270
In the House, civil contempt must be authorized by a resolution
formalizing a contempt citation and authorizing a congressional
component or House General Counsel to initiate civil litigation.271 The
civil actions involving Joshua Bolten and Harriet Miers (Miers)272 and
Eric Holder (Holder)273 are the only examples of civil enforcement by
the House. Given the effectiveness of inherent and criminal contempt
266. See Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives (Feb. 29, 2008) (explaining the Department’s refusal to prosecute
White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten and former White House Counsel Harriet Miers).
267. See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen, to John A. Boehner, Speaker,
U.S. House of Representatives (June 28, 2012) (explaining the Department’s refusal to
prosecute Attorney General Eric Holder).
268. In light of this reality, two commentators argue for court-appointed special
prosecutors anytime Congress holds an executive branch official in contempt. See Stanley M.
Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a Prompt and Orderly
Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch
Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986).
269. See 2 U.S.C. § 288d (2012).
270. KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 34.
271. See id. at 34–35.
272. Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).
273. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).

2014]

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT

937

remedies against non-federal oversight targets, it is not surprising that to
date the House has sought civil contempt remedies only against
executive branch officials.
As will be discussed in Part V, the Executive continues to vigorously
contest the justiciability of civil contempt actions brought against
executive branch officials who are resisting congressional oversight
pursuant to a presidential assertion of executive privilege.
2. Congressional Self-Help Remedies
In addition to its contempt power, Congress has numerous formal
and informal self-help remedies at its disposal. Congress may use its
legislative authorization power as leverage against executive officials or
agencies to obtain oversight materials. It may similarly employ its
control over the nation’s purse against resistant executive branch
entities. Further, the Senate can threaten to hold up executive
nominees with its advice and consent power or try impeachments
approved by the House. Finally, Congress can use the media to push its
own agenda by placing unwanted attention on the Executive Branch.
a. Legislative Authorizations
Congress may use legislative authorizations as a means of enforcing
its oversight prerogatives. As the Congressional Oversight Manual
notes, “[t]hrough its authorization power, Congress exercises significant
control over any government agency.”274 According to a leading expert
on congressional procedure, the “authorization process is an important
oversight tool.”275 For example, Congress could eliminate, or threaten
to eliminate, a position of a recalcitrant witness. It could assign a
function to a different agency or end a program of interest to the
Executive. Further, Congress could withhold reauthorization for a
program or other executive branch priority as leverage to obtain
requested oversight materials.276

274. KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 17.
275. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS 297 (6th ed. 2004).
276. See KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 18 (“Expiration of an agency’s program
provides an excellent chance for in-depth oversight . . . .”).
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b. Appropriations Power
Congress views the appropriations process as one of its “most
important forms of oversight.”277 But in addition to the process itself, it
can serve as a remedial tool. Congress has employed the “power of the
purse” to enforce its oversight interests.278 If an executive branch entity
is resisting congressional oversight requests, “the appropriations for the
agency or department involved can be cut off or reduced when
requested information is not supplied.”279
c. Senate Advice and Consent
The Senate may use its power of advice and consent in the executive
nominations process as leverage to obtain documents or secure witness
testimony from the Executive.280 It is a common practice.281 The
Senate’s leverage may be more pronounced in periods of divided
277. Id.
278. Id. at 4.
279. ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 18.
280. See id. (noting that “a hold can be placed by a senator on agency nominees until the
information is released”).
281. See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Senator May Block Successor to Defense Policy Chief
Feith, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20
05/06/22/AR2005062201989.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DK5T-ALWW (describing
efforts by Senator Carl M. Levin to obtain documents related to an investigation as to how
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, “shaped the administration’s view
of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda before the U.S. invaded Iraq”); Pauline
Jelinek, Graham Says He’ll Block Nominations over Benghazi, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 28,
2013, 6:03 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/graham-says-hell-block-nominations-over-bengh
azi, archived at http://perma.cc/3DQK-CM3R (discussing Senator Lindsay Graham’s use of
holds to gain congressional access to all survivors of the September 11–12, 2011, attack on
U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya); Jason Miller, Sen. Coburn to Put Hold on OPM
Director Nominee, FED. NEWS RADIO (July. 31, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.federalnewsradio
.com/520/3406794/Sen-Coburn-to-put-hold-on-OPM-director-nominee, archived at http://per
ma.cc/JZU2-7DHW (relating Senator Tom Coburn’s willingness to use a hold to procure an
answer from the White House and Office of Personnel Management about how the
Affordable Care Act applies to lawmakers and their staff); Brendan Sasso, Grassley to Hold
up Obama’s Nominees to FCC over LightSquared Documents, THE HILL (Nov. 3, 2011, 5:31
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/191639-grassley-to-hold-up-fcc-nomin
ees-over-lightsquared-documents, archived at http://perma.cc/PDR9-7KH2 (reporting Senator
Chuck Grassley’s use of holds while seeking access related to a satellite-based broadband
service that allegedly interferes with Global Positioning Systems (GPS)); Jordy Yager,
Grassley Threatens to Hold up ATF Nominee over Separate Dispute, THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2013,
9:44 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/280447-grassley-threatens-to-hold-up-atf-nomi
nee-over-separate-dispute, archived at http://perma.cc/STU2-MY6X (discussing Senator
Grassley’s use of a hold while seeking “access to 1,200 documents” related to a congressional
investigation of a False Claims Act settlement with the city of St. Paul).
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government; however, the Senate’s countermajoritarian procedures—
including the practice of “holds” by one member alone282—render it an
effective method of self-help. The Senate is often successful at
obtaining disputed information from the Executive by means of the
confirmation process.283 This remedy comes at a political cost to
Congress, however, because it puts Congress in the position of
obstructing the nominations process where the germaneness to the
oversight dispute is attenuated.
d. Impeachment
The Constitution also grants Congress power to remove the
President and certain other executive branch officials by means of
impeachment.284 It provides:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.285
The House of Representatives has the “sole Power of Impeachment.”286
The Senate has the “sole Power to try all Impeachments” and may
convict upon a two-thirds vote.287
282. See Robert F. Turner, Constitutional Implications of Senate “Holds” on Treaties
and Diplomatic Nominations, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175, 184–85 (2006) (criticizing Senate
‘hold’ procedures as unconstitutional and noting that they are “sometimes used to pressure
the President or an executive department to turn over documents”).
283. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S4139–44 (daily ed. June 28, 2011) (Senator Grassley: “I
also understand that Senator Chambliss has reached an agreement . . . [with the Justice
Department that] he has sought on behalf of the Intelligence Committee. Accordingly, I now
lift my opposition to the Senate holding a vote on [Deputy Attorney General nominee James]
Cole’s nomination.”); Tony Bertuca, Senator Lifts Hold On Shyu’s Nomination; DOD To
Audit Russian Helo Deal, INSIDE THE ARMY (Sept. 24, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR
20303203; Cheryl K. Chumley, EPA Hands Over Documents to Advance McCarthy
Nomination, HEARTLAND (June 6, 2013), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2013/0
6/06/epa-hands-over-documents-advance-mccarthy-nomination, archived at http://perma.cc/H
N6J-3VJD; Kimberley Dozier, White House to Give Benghazi Documents to Senators,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/22/whit
e-house-benghazi-documents_n_2744980.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3JAF-YZ2W; Sean
Reilly, Hold Lifted on Senate Confirmation of OPM Director, FED. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013, 6:00
AM), available at http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20130807/PERSONNEL01/308070004/
Hold-lifted-Senate-confirmation-OPM-director, archived at http://perma.cc/F9JB-8VCJ.
284. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6.
285. Id. art. II, § 4.
286. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
287. Id. § 3, cl. 6.
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There is a longstanding debate about whether the phrase “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” has substantive content or is merely a
reflection of the political determination of Congress.288 There is a
related question as to whether an executive official could be convicted
by means of impeachment for obstruction of a congressional
investigation.
Congress, unsurprisingly, takes the view that oversight disputes may
serve as the basis for impeachment.289 As a stark example: the third
Article of Impeachment of President Nixon was predicated on his
failure to comply with congressional subpoenas issued by the House
Judiciary Committee.290 Specifically, the Committee alleged that
Richard M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to what materials
were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the
Presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of
Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and
judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of
impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of
Representatives.291

288. See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMPEACHMENT: AN
OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 22 (2010)
(“Thus treason and bribery may be fairly clear as to their meanings, but the remainder of the
language has been the subject of considerable debate.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal,
Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
169, 169–70 (2000) (discussing Congress as the venue for constitutional interpretation of the
phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”); Alex Simpson Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U.
PA. L. REV. 651, 676–95 (1916) (arguing there was confusion as to the meaning of the phrase
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors” at the Constitutional Convention). For more on
impeachment, see generally BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS (2012);
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); Michael J. Klarman,
Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 631 (1999).
289. ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 19 (suggesting that, “in an exceptional case, the
official might be impeached”).
290. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 4 (1974).
291. Id. At the time, William Van Alstyne argued that article III of the Nixon
impeachment represented bootstrapping by Congress because it sought to enforce views of its
own powers without seeking a court to sustain its views. See William Van Alstyne, The Third
Impeachment Article: Congressional Bootstrapping, 60 A.B.A. J. 1199, 1201–02 (1974). While
I do not agree that court review is a condition precedent to impeachment, there is a
bootstrapping problem related to use of contempt or impeachment power as an independent
basis to justify congressional investigative action.
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Because President Nixon resigned from office, the House did not vote
on the resolution.292 Therefore, the obstruction of Congress ground for
impeachment was not put to further test.
Impeachment is an extraordinary remedy. When leveled against an
executive official, it supplants the President’s removal power. When
invoked against a President or Vice President, it overturns an election.
Impeachment exacts tremendous political costs on Congress and the
political system overall. It remains, however, the most powerful tool of
self-help at Congress’s disposal.
e. Political Campaign and Press Narratives
Informally, Congress may take its case to the public through the
media and political campaigns. Political pressure, if sufficient, can be an
effective motivator for the Executive to relent to congressional
demands.293 This informal remedy benefits our constitutional scheme.
Political pressure is often a good barometer for the two most relevant
factors in an interbranch clash: the level of congressional need and the
significance of the executive branch interests informing resistance. As
noted previously, the 9/11 Commission obtained the President’s
intelligence briefing materials largely due to the political intensity
following the catastrophic terrorist attacks on the United States.294 In
most other contexts—even those implicating potential executive branch
misconduct—the executive branch interests in confidentiality and
candor of advice would likely protect similar intelligence products from
congressional production.
In practice, both Congress and the Executive seek to shape the
political environment in which their oversight disputes play out.
Depending on the nature of the inquiry, Congress can develop
substantive themes about misconduct, maladministration, and
corruption in the Executive.295 Congress can also promote procedural

292. See H.R. Res. 803, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 2349–50 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 931305 (1974) (House Judiciary Committee report recommending President Nixon’s
impeachment).
293. See PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, supra note 120, at 43 (“It’s newsworthy when
the executive branch doesn’t comply with the legislative branch’s duty to conduct oversight.
Attention garnered from news coverage can lead to pressure from the top that shakes down
the information needed.”).
294. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, Jim Jordan, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight
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arguments about the executive branch resistance to oversight, including
charges of delay, irresponsibility, stonewalling, lawlessness, and
obstruction.296 Again, depending on the credibility and gravity of the
inquiry, such arguments could eventually flare into an inferno like
Watergate, but most trundle along as slow-burn partisan controversies
like Solyndra.297
For its part, the Executive has a slightly different set of incentives as
to political narratives. Depending on the nature of the congressional
inquiry, the Executive may defend itself on substantive, procedural, or
ad hominem grounds. Put another way, the Executive could deny the
allegations, bemoan congressional investigative tactics, or attack the
credibility of the particular congressional investigator.
As the
beneficiary of the status quo, no news is literally good news. Therefore,
the fewer press stories and political rhetoric about oversight disputes,
the better for the Executive. As a result, much of the Executive’s work
on political environment shaping takes place behind the scenes. By
means of research, documents, and argument, the Executive will often
seek to dissuade reporters from reporting on stories where it believes
there is a trumped up or non-credible congressional allegation. If a
reporter is determined to write a negative story, the Executive will often
try to soften the coverage by pointing to mitigating facts.
Congress has advantages in the political framing of oversight
disputes because the Executive is in the position of resisting a
congressional investigative process. In addition, the media has an
institutional interest in greater disclosure and therefore tends to tilt
coverage in favor of Congress. There is another point that is difficult to
navigate for the Executive in the political arena: often an important
executive confidentiality interest has nothing to do with the substance of
the congressional investigation. This phenomenon creates tension
within the Executive and puts agencies resisting oversight in an adverse
political posture vis-à-vis Congress.
Imagine that Congress is investigating wrongdoing at an agency and
writes its document requests in a manner that calls for a large tranche of
material that does not raise any executive branch hackles but also would
cover tangential deliberations related to presidential appointments and

& Gov’t Spending, & Trey Gowdly, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C.,
Census, & the Nat’l Archives, to Steven Chu, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy 4 (Aug. 14, 2014).
296. See, e.g., id.
297. See, e.g., id. at 1.
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pending agency adjudications. Also assume, for a moment, that the
Executive believes that its conduct is entirely defensible. The executive
branch agency head will have an incentive to produce all the requested
materials in an effort to end the scrutiny, but the Office of Legal
Counsel and the White House may want the agency to continue
principled objections to the requests that implicate broader executive
branch interests. Thereafter, the agency is left open to charges of
stonewalling that congressional actors may then promote as evidence
that the substantive allegations are true. The Executive as a whole must
weigh this political cost to the agency with all its various oversight
interactions across the federal government.
Neither Congress nor the Executive looks good when they are in
conflict, and purely political remedies can sometimes be obtained by
heat rather than light. However, political pressure is generally good at
balancing congressional need with executive branch interests. Further, a
thoroughly political mechanism is especially appropriate for resolution
of disputes between the political branches.
Upon scrutiny, it becomes clear that the vast majority of self-help
remedial schemes available to Congress in the separation of powers
context are unavailable in the context of enforcement action against a
private party. As such, where private parties frustrate Congress’s
compulsory processes, criminal contempt reveals itself as the
appropriate, and often only, formal remedy.
In contrast, self-help remedies are available to Congress in disputes
with the Executive. They also allow political will and leverage to
resolve inherently political disputes without calling on the judiciary to
intervene. Congress, in fact, regularly employs self-help remedies on
oversight matters. However, consistent with its litigation perspective,
the House has initiated civil contempt litigation in the two highest
profile interbranch matters over the last decade: Miers and Holder.298
B. Congressional Litigation Perspective on Remedies
Congress believes its subpoenas should be enforceable against the
Executive through all three types of contempt. As noted above, there
are functional impediments to inherent and criminal contempt remedies
in interbranch disputes.299 As such, Congress has turned to civil
298. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2013); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).
299. See supra Part IV.A.1.a–b.
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contempt remedies as the primary method for vindicating oversight
interests resisted at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. To
Congress, such matters are justiciable. Furthermore, Congress would
like to see routine judicial enforcement of congressional subpoenas.300
Congress derives significant political cost savings by means of a
litigation enforcement model. While Congress bears some political costs
for initiating litigation against the Executive, the primary costs are paid
during the contempt proceeding antecedent to the litigation. Once it is
in the courts, Congress externalizes the enforcement costs by
outsourcing them to the judiciary. Aside from briefs and the ultimate
decision, there is little further political capital expended during the
pendency of the litigation.
In contrast, self-help remedies require Congress to internalize their
enforcement costs. If the Senate holds up an executive nomination over
a document dispute, the Senators will have to face the ire of interest
groups and other stakeholders to that nomination. The same is true
with analogous uses of authorization or appropriations remedies. As
such, even though Congress uses them as a matter of course, self-help
remedies are not preferable to Congress as an alternative to a judicial
enforcement mechanism.
Instead, Congress’s desired result is a definitive ruling from a court,
with binding precedent, enforcing Congress’s entitlement to executive
branch information.301 The precedential effect of Congress’s desired
litigation remedy also would serve as a deterrent to the Executive in
future information access disputes. Having adopted a litigation model,
of course Congress prefers a litigation remedy.
C. Executive Transactional Perspective on Remedies
Consistent with its transactional perspective on the nature of
congressional oversight, the Executive takes the position that
congressional subpoena enforcement actions are nonjusticiable in
interbranch disputes. For example, in Holder, the Executive argued:
“This case is not a case or controversy under Article III: it is a
quintessentially political dispute between the Branches over the scope

300. See generally Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-01332ABJ) [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss], ECF No. 17.
301. Of course, Congress could have a different perspective in the event of an adverse
ruling in Holder.
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of their respective constitutional powers. The Constitution itself, and
not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the mechanism for
resolving such contests.”302
Putting aside the strength or weakness of the Department’s political
question and judicial abstention argument, it is clear that the Executive
views this type of dispute as inappropriate for, if not incapable of,
judicial resolution on the merits. Rather, the Executive believes the
appropriate remedial scheme for Congress to enforce its prerogatives is
found in Article I, not Article III. Again, in Holder, the Executive
argued:
The Founders carefully set out the tools by which Congress may
protect its institutional interests, and they are substantial.
Among other powers, Congress can withhold funds from the
Executive Branch, override vetoes, decline to enact legislation,
refuse to act on nominations, and adjourn. If Congress is
dissatisfied with the President’s response to a congressional
investigation, it is free to employ these or any other means of
self-help within its constitutional authority to reach a political
accommodation—but only if it is willing to incur the associated
political costs. Cf. The Federalist No. 51 (Madison) (“Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition.”). The Executive Branch
must similarly weigh the harm from congressional incursion into
its institutional prerogatives against the costs that may flow from
resistance. That is how the political Branches have traditionally
resolved such conflicts.303
Put another way, Congress should engage in self-help rather than
seeking judicial enforcement. To the Executive, political disputes call
for political remedies. Negotiation and leverage, not judicial resolution
creating legal entitlements, is the proper path. While the Supreme
Court has not passed on the question, the Executive has lost on the
justiciability issue in lower courts in both Miers304 and Holder.305

302.
303.
304.
305.

Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 75, at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 98 (D.D.C. 2008).
979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2013).
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN ACTION:
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM V. HOLDER
The Supreme Court has never ruled on a constitutional collision
between Congress and the Executive arising from a congressional
subpoena frustrated by the President’s assertion of executive privilege.
In the absence of Supreme Court pronouncements, the political
branches feel legally unconstrained to adhere to their incompatible
constitutional perspectives.306 Oversight Committee v. Holder307 squarely
presents these irreconcilable theories to the courts. For the reasons set
forth below, court resolution of this matter should endeavor to preserve
a healthy level of interbranch tension created by such incongruity. The
court should rely heavily on the Executive model—incentivizing
resolution through accommodation and compromise while safeguarding
the legitimate functional interests of Congress and the Executive—but
also needs to reserve a role for the judiciary. Choosing one of the
competing models wholesale would be a grave mistake.
With respect to judicial involvement in interbranch congressional
oversight disputes, the two political branches are at extreme odds. The
Executive continues to argue that such disputes are categorically
nonjusticiable. This viewpoint fails to adequately deter the Executive
from asserting meritless confidentiality arguments. It also fails to
recognize the Court’s need to preserve its ability to restore and preserve
constitutional order in the event of a genuine separation of powers
crisis. For its part, Congress’s belief that the courts should enforce
Article I interests as a pro forma matter is also a bridge too far. It fails
to account for Congress’s lack of meaningful discovery regulation, and it
is too dismissive of legitimate confidentiality interests that inform
assertions of executive privilege.
As discussed below, executive privilege is a presidential assertion of
executive branch confidentiality interests that has constitutional
dimension. Holder represents a collision of the two vehicles of the
political branches’ constitutional prerogatives: congressional subpoenas
and executive privilege.

306. See Chad T. Marriott, Comment, A Four-Step Inquiry to Guide Judicial Review of
Executive Privilege Disputes Between the Political Branches, 87 OR. L. REV. 259, 274 (2008)
(“Avoiding the issue has left Congress and the President free from constraint in their
negotiations over the release of information.”).
307. 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
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A number of principles should guide the courts as they address the
arguments in Holder. First, accommodation and compromise between
the political branches, without judicial involvement, is the healthiest
outcome for the constitutional structure.
Second, courts have
jurisdiction to decide such a dispute but should only exercise that
jurisdiction as a matter of last resort. Third, when a court accepts
jurisdiction, its first role should be that of a mediator rather than an
implement of enforcement. Fourth, if the mediation approach fails, the
court will be required to get into the messy business balancing of
congressional need with executive confidentiality interests. This should
be a particularized, rather than categorical, analysis. It should also
require congressional requests that are narrowly tailored to Congress’s
needs so as to minimize executive branch disruption. Finally, the courts
need to be more solicitous of executive branch confidentiality interests
than the lower courts have been over the last twenty-five years.308 There
are a number of important executive branch functions that would be
degraded if disclosed to Congress, especially on the basis of untailored
assertions of need. Congress requires information from the Executive
to perform its legislative function, but where such information requests
conflict with executive branch functions, they need to exact minimal
necessary burden.
Holder ripens this discussion. The litigation has already produced
important district court precedent finding the dispute justiciable.309 The
parties’ pending summary judgment motions, absent settlement, call on
the district court to decide whether the deliberative process privilege
that serves as a basis of President Obama’s assertion of executive
privilege will shield withheld documents from production to Congress in
its investigation of Operation Fast and Furious. In order to reach that
decision, the courts will have to navigate both the litigation and
transactional models of oversight.
A. Executive Privilege: A Contested Doctrine
As noted in Part II.C.1 above, litigation platforms for congressional
oversight disputes are scant. Further, consistent with this Article’s

308. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1119 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (refusing to extend the presidential privilege to documents prepared for the Deputy
Attorney General).
309. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (concluding that “neither legal nor prudential
considerations support the dismissal”).
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proposed course, courts have been loath to insert themselves into
interbranch discovery disputes. Legal precedent evaluating presidential
assertions of executive privilege to date has come in the context of
criminal investigations and civil litigation involving private parties,
especially litigation arising under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).310 Executive privilege is an assertion of presidential authority
to withhold information from a judicial or congressional proceeding.311
No legal doctrine is more emblematic of the vast chasm separating
the political branches over congressional oversight than assertions of the
“deliberative process” privilege. Several factors lead to this impasse.
The privilege protects the decision-making process of government
agencies. It is designed to encourage frank discussions on matters of
policy within the Executive, protect against premature disclosure of
policies before they have been adopted, and minimize public confusion
that might result from disclosure of discarded policy options and
rationales.312 Whether it can ever shield disclosure of information
requested by Congress is at the heart of the Holder litigation.313
While it has a pedigree dating back to the principles of the English
“crown privilege,”314 most recent legal precedent on the deliberative
process privilege develops in the context of litigation under FOIA.
Specifically, Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or
intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”315
Courts have construed this language to “exempt those documents [that

310. See infra Part V.A.1.b.
311. Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (1974).
Executive privilege may be asserted in a criminal matter or in litigation involving private
parties. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Thus, it is a
doctrine that is broader than the executive–congressional conflict that is the subject of this
Article.
312. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 366
(2009).
313. 979 F. Supp. 2d at 16 n.7. The court adopted the Oversight Committee’s
articulation of the question presented: “[C]an the executive properly assert executive
privilege to shield an agency’s deliberative processes when the records in dispute do not
reveal advice provided to the President himself or address his core constitutional
functions?” Id.
314. See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54
MO. L. REV. 279, 283 (1989) (citing, among others, JOHN HUXLEY BUZZARD, RICHARD
MAY & M. N. HOWARD, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE § 14-04 (13th ed. 1982)).
315. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012).
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are] . . . normally privileged in the civil discovery context.”316 According
to the Department of Justice, the deliberative process is the most
commonly invoked privilege by the Executive in FOIA matters.317
However, by its own legislative terms, FOIA, and therefore Exemption
5, is inapplicable to congressional requests.318
Legal precedent on the deliberative process privilege is unresolved
as to its applicability in the congressional context. But even if the
deliberative process privilege applies to congressional requests, there is
ample court opinion language to suggest that it is a heavily qualified
privilege.
1. Executive Privilege: Background and Legal Precedent
Information access disputes between Congress and the President
date back to the Washington Administration.319 Many presidents have
refused to produce information requested by Congress based on an
assertion of privilege,320 over time formalizing the Executive’s process
for assertions of executive privilege.321 However, due in large part to the
political branches’ competing visions of constitutional interplay,322 the
doctrine remains highly controversial and unsettled.
316. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); see also FTC v. Grolier,
Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26 (1983); Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, 819 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
317. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 312, at 366.
318. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (2012) (“This section is not authority to withhold information
from Congress.”).
319. See, e.g., Weaver & Jones, supra note 314, at 284 (noting President Washington’s
assertion of privilege against congressional inquiries into the St. Clair military expedition and
Jay Treaty negotiations); Devins, supra note 204, at 109 & n.1 (noting that, in the case of the
Jay Treaty request, President Washington provided the information to the House
notwithstanding his objections).
320. See Cox, supra note 311, at 1395–1405 (outlining the historical episodes of
presidential refusal to provide requested information to Congress that could be characterized
as executive privilege). See generally MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2008).
321. See ROSENBERG, supra note 320, at 14–15.
322. At least one commentator called the privilege itself a “myth.” RAOUL BERGER,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); see also Raoul Berger,
Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865, 887 (1975) (“History
in short, demonstrates that Congress was designed to exercise the inquisitorial power
exercised by Parliament, that this power was unqualified, that no member of the English
executive had claimed to be exempt from this power, and that no member of the several
Conventions had claimed for the President any exemption from this power of the Grand
Inquest of the Nation.”).
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The Supreme Court addressed executive privilege in United States v.
Nixon.323 President Nixon asserted executive privilege in order to deny
production of documents and tape recordings subpoenaed by the
Watergate Special Prosecutor.324
That case involved a criminal
investigation, representing an intrabranch dispute between the President
and a subordinate prosecutor325 rather than an oversight dispute
between political branches. Still, it implicated interbranch friction
between the Executive and the judiciary.326
In rejecting the President’s assertion of an absolute privilege, the
Supreme Court described its duty “to resolve . . . competing interests in
a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch.”327 The
Court recognized the constitutional foundations of executive privilege:
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately. These are the considerations justifying
a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The
privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution.328
Thereafter the Court applied a balancing test, weighing “historic
commitment to the rule of law” against the President’s interests in
confidentiality.329
Nixon specifically declined to opine on the balance between a
President’s “confidentiality interest and congressional demands for
information.”330 It is unclear what effect, if any, a shift in context from
criminal prosecution to congressional proceeding would have on the
Court’s analysis. The Court suggested that presidential advisors would

323. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
324. See id. at 688.
325. Id. at 692 (noting the President’s argument that the matter was “an intra-branch
dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive Branch”).
326. Id. at 707 (noting the obstruction that an “unqualified privilege would place in the
way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions”).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 708.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 712 n.19.
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not “temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of
disclosure . . . in the context of a criminal prosecution.”331
Congressional requests for information, by contrast, are legion. In
addition, Congress contains a President’s political adversaries, whereas
the judiciary, while by no means free of its own brand of politics, is
guided by generally neutral principles. Furthermore, prosecutors and
courts do not have access to Congress’s non-judicial remedies to
vindicate their interests. These points militate in favor of a stronger
executive privilege vis-à-vis Congress than the courts.
On the other hand, the legislative function is critical to the
constitutional scheme. Generally, congressional need for information is
strong, and the Court would likely be well outside its comfort zone
deciding about the needs of its coordinate branch. Such arguments
suggest the Court might favor congressional interests or see the
criminal–congressional distinction as one without a difference.
a. Executive Privilege Cases Involving Congressional Subpoenas
Including Holder, there are only five court cases addressing
congressional–executive information disputes involving congressional
subpoenas in conflict with a presidential assertion of executive
privilege.332 While significant in many respects, Miers, AT&T, and U.S.
House of Representatives all address jurisdictional and justiciability
issues, and none reach the merits.333
Only one case, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon,334 reaches the merits of a clash between
congressional oversight needs and executive confidentiality interests.
There, the Senate had established a select committee to “investigate
‘illegal, improper or unethical activities’” related to the 1972 presidential
election.335 The committee subpoenaed President Nixon to obtain tape
recordings and documents related to alleged criminal activity and

331. Id. at 712.
332. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); Comm. on
the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. House of
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
333. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d at 134; Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 98; House of
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 153.
334. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
335. Id. at 726 (quoting S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 119 CONG. REC. 3849 (1973)).

952

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:881

government misconduct.336 In response, President Nixon asserted
executive privilege.337
The court balanced congressional need with executive
confidentiality interests in holding that “the sufficiency of the
Committee’s showing must depend solely on whether the subpoenaed
evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the
Committee’s functions.”338
Thereafter, it assessed subsequent,
overlapping activity by the House Judiciary Committee as a factor
weakening the Senate committee’s claim.339 The standard it then
erected for the committee was “whether the subpoenaed materials are
critical to the performance of its legislative functions.”340
Senate Select Committee is significant to the competing oversight
models because it engaged in a searching, interest-balancing exercise
and an exacting inquiry into congressional need. As such, even though
it represents a judicial resolution disfavored by the Executive,341 this
case reflects an executive sensibility about the nature of interbranch
conflict. However, although it does not analytically conflict with
Nixon’s reasoning, it predates the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on
executive privilege.
Unlike Holder, the subpoenaed materials
implicated direct presidential communications.342 It also predates D.C.
Circuit precedent that has disfavored executive privilege in nonoversight contexts.
b. Other Significant Executive Privilege Precedent
In the period since Watergate, lower courts have been less than
solicitous of executive privilege, albeit in non-oversight contexts. While
there have been a number of decisions evaluating privilege claims, two
D.C. Circuit cases stand out for purposes of this Article: In re Sealed
Case (Espy)343 in the criminal context and Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
336. Id. at 726–27.
337. Id. at 727.
338. Id. at 731; see also Marshall, supra note 18, at 803–08 (arguing that congressional
need is often questionable because there are few political costs due to, and negligible process
constraints on, initiation of an investigation).
339. Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 732.
340. Id.
341. Judge Wilkey argued, in a concurrence, that the “constitutional principle of
separation of powers ma[de] the issue . . . a political question and therefore not justiciable.”
Id. at 734 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
342. Id. at 726 (majority opinion).
343. 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Department of Justice344 in the FOIA context. Both cases suggest that
the D.C. Circuit, which is often the final arbiter in separation of powers
litigation, is not inclined to accept the transactional model worldview.
In Espy, the court held that President Clinton’s assertion of
executive privilege over eighty-four documents—related to the 1994
resignation of Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy—could not defeat a
grand jury subpoena.345 The court discussed the distinction between
presidential communications and deliberative process rationales for
assertions of executive privilege.346 According to the court, presidential
communications privilege has a constitutional basis,347 but deliberative
process privilege is primarily derived from common law.348 The court
also noted that deliberative process privilege “disappears altogether
when there is any reason to believe government misconduct
occurred.”349 It then declined to apply deliberative process privilege
analysis because it found that the presidential communications privilege
is stronger and yet insufficient to defeat production.350
The reasoning in Espy is particularly troubling to the Executive due
to its very narrow conception of executive privilege.351 As an initial
matter, it appeared to confine a constitutional rationale for executive
privilege to decisions made by the President personally and to cover
only those people and decisions in his immediate proximity.352
Therefore, deliberative processes at the departments and agencies are
likely to receive far less protection. In addition, the court’s suggestion
that deliberative process privilege dissolves when there is “any reason to
believe government misconduct occurred” is very cold comfort when
transposed from the criminal context to a partisan Congress.
In the Judicial Watch FOIA litigation, a public interest group sought
to compel production of materials related to President Clinton’s
exercise of pardon power.353 The White House is not subject to FOIA,
but the Act covers records in the Office of the Pardon Attorney at the
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Espy, 121 F.3d at 762.
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 749, 752.
Id. at 752.
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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Department of Justice.354 Holding true to Espy, in Judicial Watch, the
D.C. Circuit rejected the Department’s argument that the Pardon
Attorney was a presidential advisor as a functional matter, especially
with respect to internal Department documents that the Department
never transmitted to the White House.355 The Executive believes the
Pardon Attorney supports an exclusive presidential function and does
not believe the proximity and formalism associated with an institutional
location should have decided Judicial Watch.
The D.C. Circuit’s refusal to recognize an evidentiary privilege for
secret service agents designed to promote presidential safety provides
further evidence of skepticism of executive confidentiality interests.356
Based on Cheney, the Supreme Court may be a more hospitable venue
to executive arguments, but the consequences of an adverse ruling by
the highest Court should give executive branch litigants pause.
2. Congress: Executive Privilege Is Narrow and Heavily Qualified
Consistent with its procedural litigation view, according to Congress,
executive privilege may only be validly asserted on presidential
communications privilege. Congress believes that the presidential
communications privilege is the only constitutionally based privilege
rationale. Congress further believes that even that privilege is heavily
qualified and should regularly yield to congressional need. It views most
assertions of executive privilege as frivolous.357 Further, after serving as
Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox argued:
Ideally, I think, the legislative right should prevail in every case
in which either the Senate or House of Representatives votes to
override the Executive’s objections, provided that the
information is relevant to a matter which is under inquiry and

354. Id. at 1119.
355. Id.; see Marriott, supra note 306, at 285–86 (noting that the Judicial Watch decision
turned more on organizational structure than functional role).
356. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Rubin v. United
States, 525 U.S. 990 (1998).
357. See, e.g., The History of Congressional Access to Deliberative Justice Department
Documents, Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. (2002) (report
by Charles Tiefer on Executive Privilege Overclaiming at the Justice Department). Before his
move to academia, Professor Tiefer served as Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel of the
U.S. House of Representatives.
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within the jurisdiction of the body issuing the subpoena,
including its constitutional jurisdiction.358
In other words, Cox argues the courts should routinely enforce
congressional prerogatives even in the face of an assertion of executive
privilege.
Congress takes an especially dim view of the deliberative process
component of executive privilege doctrine, which it views as wholly
inapplicable to congressional oversight of the Executive. In the Fast and
Furious investigation, Chairman Issa cites In re Sealed Case (Espy)359 for
the proposition that the documents in dispute
are at best deliberative documents between and among
Department [of Justice] personnel who lack the requisite
“operational proximity” to the President. As such, they cannot
be withheld pursuant to the constitutionally-based executive
privilege. . . . Both, the Espy court observed, are executive
privileges designed to protect the confidentiality of Executive
Branch decision-making. The deliberative-process privilege,
however, which applies to executive branch officials generally, is
a common law privilege that requires a lower threshold of need
to be overcome, and “disappears altogether when there is any
reason to believe government misconduct has occurred.”360
Chairman Issa’s argument is consistent with the view expressed in the
Congressional Oversight Manual published by the Congressional
Research Service361 and is a centerpiece of the House’s summary
judgment brief in Holder.362
358. Cox, supra note 311, at 1434.
359. 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
360. Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting ROSENBERG,
supra note 320, at 17–18 (quoting Espy, 121 F.3d at 746)). Espy dealt with a grand jury
subpoena in a criminal investigation and not a congressional subpoena. Espy, 121 F.3d at
735–36. One can debate whether that distinction is material in a separation of powers
dispute. Moreover, the Espy court did not reach the question of whether the documents at
issue were subject to the deliberative process privilege. Id. at 758.
361. KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 45–46 (characterizing deliberative process
privilege as a “common law privilege . . . that is easily overcome by a showing of need by an
investigatory body” and noting that “congressional practice has been to treat . . . acceptance
[of deliberative process privilege] as discretionary with the committee”).
362. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 25–33, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, No. 12-cv01332-ABJ (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Mem. of P.&A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for
Summ. J.], ECF No. 61 (making the argument under the heading “Deliberative Process Does
Not Excuse the Attorney General’s Non-Compliance Because the Privilege Does Not Apply
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Aside from the question of whether the doctrine is applicable to
congressional requests, Congress also views executive branch
deliberative information as highly probative to its legislative inquiries.
As Chairman Goss argued,
It is exactly the “uncoordinated,” “deliberative,” “internal,” and
“pre-decisional” documents of an agency that Congress needs in
most cases. These documents can provide unique insight into the
full spectrum of thought on any given issue pending before an
agency and Congress. Without access to such documents,
Congress would be left only with the “spin” the executive branch
agency opted to provide to the legislative branch. This result,
without question, would only serve to undermine the legitimate
authority of Congress to conduct independent oversight.
Therefore, I would expect the committee to reject all efforts to
extend the FOIA Exemption 5 to congressional requests for
information.363
Chairman Goss articulates an important element of Congress’s
perspective on the trenchant interbranch conflict related to deliberative
process privilege. First, he suggests that access to executive branch
deliberations, at least as to policy formulation, would help inform the
congressional legislative process.364 Such legislative deliberation is the
touchstone of congressional oversight authority.
In addition, Chairman Goss suggests that failure to provide Congress
with such materials would significantly hamper the congressional
oversight function itself because it would only receive access to postdecisional information.365 His concern contemplates a significant and
legitimate concern about an unlimited deliberative process privilege. It
would simply shield too much information and would have no internal
limitations beyond the character of information as predecisional and
related to policy formulation. Such concerns are especially valid in the
context of an investigation into executive branch wrongdoing rather
than a policy formulation inquiry. To accept categorical application of
deliberative process privilege as a bar to congressional requests would
be a principle struggling to find cognizable limits.

to Congressional Subpoenas”).
363. H.R. REP. NO. 106-130, pt. 1, at 40 (1999).
364. Id.
365. Id.
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Ironically, congressional deliberations are not available to the other
branches or the public without the express consent of Congress as a
result of the Speech or Debate Clause.366 As with the Executive,
Congress desires to protect against the chilling of open and honest
deliberations that would accompany exposing representatives’
statements to the public. Information protected under the Speech or
Debate Clause is that of legitimate “legislative acts,”367 and a reviewing
court must interpret that protection broadly to protect the free
expression of ideas among legislators who would otherwise fear political
backlash in raising concerns.368 This broad interpretation ensures the
independent operation of Congress.369 Accordingly, Congress clearly
appreciates the values undergirding a deliberative process privilege and
other similar confidentiality interests, but it does not think such
assertions have merit when made by the Executive in the context of
congressional oversight requests.
3. Executive: Privilege Has Many Viable Oversight Components
In contrast with Congress’s view of the limited role executive
privilege plays relating to oversight requests, the Executive believes that
the term “executive privilege” refers to a bundle of components, all of
which may be validly asserted against congressional requests. These
366. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [the
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”); see also
CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 405–07 (2011) (“Response to Subpoenas . . . Under no
circumstances may minutes or transcripts of executive sessions, or evidence of witnesses in
respect thereto, be disclosed or copied.”).
367. In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), the Supreme Court defined
legislative acts as those that are “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to
the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.” 408 U.S.
at 625
368. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (establishing that the
Speech or Debate Clause is to be “read broadly to effectuate its purposes”); Coffin v. Coffin,
4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808) (expanding upon appropriate legislative acts protected by a
similar clause in a state constitution) (“I therefore think that the article ought not to be
construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it
to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the
giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the
nature, and in the execution, of the office . . . .”).
369. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1975) (relying on the
reasoning of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951)).
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components cover a number of different types of executive branch
confidentiality interests,370 including the deliberative process privilege
that is front and center in Holder.371
The Executive has substantive interests in the applicability of the
deliberative process component of executive privilege in congressional
oversight matters. First, the Executive has long maintained the need for
its officials to be able to contribute to policy formulation and other
decisions without undue fear of retribution. As the Supreme Court
noted in United States v. Nixon, “[h]uman experience teaches that those
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper
candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the
detriment of the decisionmaking process.”372 An expectation of routine
disclosure of deliberative material to congressional actors would
significantly chill the candor necessary to provide the best possible range
of options available to executive branch decision makers.373
The Executive seeks to distinguish and confine Espy and Judicial
Watch in the congressional context. First, as it argues in Holder, the
Executive believes deliberative process privilege takes on a
constitutional character when formally asserted vis-à-vis Congress.374
The D.C. Circuit noted that the “deliberative process privilege is

370. See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege over Commc’ns Regarding EPA’s Ozone Air
Quality Standards and Cal.’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op. Att’y Gen., slip op. at
3 (June 19, 2008) (discussing “presidential communications and deliberative process
‘components’ of executive privilege”).
371. See Assertion of Exec. Privilege over Documents Generated in Response to Cong.
Investigation into Operation Fast and Furious, 36 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2 (June 19, 2012)
(Opinion of Attorney General Eric Holder).
372. 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); see also Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to
Prosecutorial Documents, 25 Op. Att’y Gen., slip op. at 2 (Dec. 10, 2001) (“If these
deliberative documents are subject to congressional scrutiny, we will face the grave danger
that prosecutors will be chilled from providing the candid and independent analysis essential
to the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion and to the fairness and integrity of federal
law enforcement.”).
373. As noted in the preceding section, while Congress believes deliberative process
rationale must yield to congressional oversight interests, it recognizes the value of the
rationale when shielding its own deliberative material from disclosure in the context of the
Speech and Debate Clause.
374. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 20–22, Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform v. Holder, No. 12-cv-01332-ABJ (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Mem. in
Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Motion for Summ. J.], ECF No. 64.
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primarily a common law privilege.”375 Moreover, both Espy and Judicial
Watch require a comparison of congressional needs to executive
grounds.376 Finally, while the Executive respects the authority of lower
courts, it will likely maintain its views in the absence of a Supreme Court
ruling foreclosing them.377
B. A Recommended Approach to Holder
In Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,378 the
Supreme Court observed that the “‘occasion[s] for constitutional
confrontation between the two branches’ should be avoided whenever
possible.”379 However, it acknowledged: “Once executive privilege is
asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision
course.”380 Holder is a three-branch collision.
This section offers an approach to the Holder litigation designed to
preserve important ambiguities and tension in the scheme of separation
of powers. Both branches will have to give ground. The Executive is
wrong to adopt a categorical view on justiciability, and Congress is
wrong to adopt a categorical view on the merits. The proper result
requires nuance, particularity, and restraint. So far, Judge Amy Berman
Jackson appears to be following such a path.381
1. Justiciability
Due to the nature of our constitutional structure, it is preferable to
have interbranch constitutional conflicts resolved by a process of
accommodation and compromise. As one district court noted, the
stakes in such confrontations are always high:
There is a sense in which the powers and operations of the
coequal, but interdependent, branches of the federal government
375. In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)
(citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 n. 35 (1982)).
376. See Espy, 121 F.3d at 754–55 (assessing investigative need against the presumptive
privilege); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(same).
377. This fact can actually motivate the Executive Branch to settle or absorb an adverse
lower court ruling to avoid a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court.
378. 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
379. Id. at 389–90 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
692 (1974)).
380. Id. at 389.
381. Judge Jackson wrote the order in Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
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are constitutionally established over theoretical fault lines.
Disputes and confrontations between those branches always
present the kinds of stress and tension that threaten to separate
and divide those lines into chasms, ultimately collapsing our
constitutionally created form of government. Hence, to avert
and minimize such tensions is always the proper and prudent
course of action.382
Goldwater v. Carter383 also provides some instructive language, albeit
in a different context. There, several members of Congress filed suit
alleging that President Carter’s termination of a treaty with Taiwan
deprived them of their constitutional legislative role.384 Justice Powell
filed a concurrence in which he argued that the complaint should have
been dismissed as unripe for judicial review:
Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between
Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless
and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress
are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and
almost invariably do, turn on political rather than legal
considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues
affecting the allocation of power between the President and
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional
impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even
individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of
issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to
resolve the conflict.385
Justice Powell suggests that political remedies should be exhausted
before the courts step in to resolve disputes between the other two
branches. His reasoning in that context has salience for congressional
oversight conflict as well.
From one perspective, a case like Holder does involve political
processes—congressional contempt and executive privilege—suggestive
of a ripened constitutional conflict. On the other hand, the civil remedy
Congress prefers bypasses its inherently political remedies like
appropriations and Senate advice and consent. In that sense, there is a
382.
1977).
383.
384.
385.

In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (M.D. Fla.
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 997.
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question under Powell’s reasoning as to whether Congress has
exhaustively taken action asserting its constitutional authority. Unlike
Goldwater, which involved only a sub-cameral group of plaintiffs,
Holder involves action by the entire House of Representatives.386 In this
way, judicial action is more appropriate in Holder than in Goldwater.
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.387 reflects a
transactional sensibility in relation to congressional oversight disputes
that is backstopped by judicial review. In seeking to avoid assumption
of jurisdiction over the interbranch dispute, the D.C. Circuit described
the branches as having areas of blended power.388 Under such a view of
the constitutional framework, the separation of powers at the margins is
indeterminate by design,389 and as such, the branches need to work out
their respective scopes of authority on a case-by-case basis. The Court
observed:
The framers, rather than attempting to define and allocate all
governmental power in minute detail, relied, we believe, on the
expectation that where conflicts in scope of authority arose
between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic
compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in the
manner most likely to result in efficient and effective functioning
of our governmental system. Under this view, the coordinate
branches . . . should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional
mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic
evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the
particular fact situation.390
Though the court strongly encouraged the political branches to resolve
disputes on their own, it still acknowledged the justiciablility of the case.
The court held that the political question doctrine would not bar judicial
review, noting that the “simple fact of a conflict between the legislative

386. Id. at 997–98.
387. 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
388. Id. at 128.
389. Such a view is evocative of Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in which he recognized a “zone of twilight” occupying the
uncertain territory where Congress and the President share authority or the branch with
superior authority is ambiguous. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
390. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d at 127 (footnote omitted).
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and executive branches over a congressional subpoena does not
preclude judicial resolution.”391
Furthermore, the AT&T court’s view seems attuned to the
Heisenberg Principle problem that counsels court reticence to interfere
in such disputes between the political branches, but in a manner that still
reserves the right to involve itself in cases of extraordinary
constitutional strain. Another court within the D.C. Circuit echoed the
importance of judicial avoidance under these circumstances: “When
constitutional disputes arise concerning the respective powers of the
Legislative and Executive Branches, judicial intervention should be
delayed until all possibilities for settlement have been exhausted.”392 As
these two opinions demonstrate, the few cases that present a concrete
interbranch oversight dispute tend to take place within the D.C. Circuit,
which has generally demonstrated sensitivity to the separation of
powers.393
Political question doctrine services the policy need to let political
branches sort out political fights. However, it does so in a way that says
“never,” and interbranch disputes about oversight really call for a
doctrine of severe avoidance—one that says “very rarely”—rather than
a doctrine of absolute jurisdictional limitation. As Professor Peter
Shane argued in the wake of the Gorsuch controversy,
When an impasse is so great that no such strategy is workable,
that impasse may signal an occasion for the laws of executive
privilege to be recrystallized. Then, and only then, should it be
necessary for a court to step in and substitute a unitary judicial
understanding for the contending positions of the political
branches.394
This approach is wise because it respects the role of other branches in
delimiting their own constitutional functions and allows for each to
energetically pursue the exercise, or protection, of those functions.

391. Id. at 126–27 (citing Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
392. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983).
393. See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002) (noting a “special role the
D.C. Circuit plays in upholding the rule of law by enforcing legal constraints on the behavior
of the President” but also “the court’s recognition of the importance of preserving the
freedom and flexibility that the President needs to do his job”).
394. Shane, supra note 35, at 542.
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It is also certainly worthy to note that the Executive lost the
justiciability argument in Miers395 and again in Holder.396 In fact, the
district court in Holder was quite dismissive of the Executive Branch’s
arguments that the court did not have the power to decide the case.397
2. Merits
Each of the parties in Holder calls on the courts to adopt its own
constitutional vision to the exclusion of the other. However, if the court
adopts the AT&T court’s sensible approach, then accommodation and
compromise becomes the touchstone in disputes between Congress and
the Executive.398 Each side raises legitimate concerns about wholesale
adoption of the opposing branch position.
Congress remains concerned that, in the absence of accessible
judicial enforcement, the Executive will act with impunity.399 As a
result, Congress worries that significant waste, fraud, and abuse will go
undetected and that legislative judgments by Congress will be adversely
affected.400 Of course, executive branch intransigence is not an
unjustified concern. Executive agencies need a distant threat of judicial
resolution; otherwise there is no incentive for those agencies to give
effect to executive policy statements recognizing the need to honor
congressional oversight interests.
The Executive remains steadfast in its concern about the damaging
effects, wrought by politicized oversight, on internal deliberative
processes. This is not, by any measure, an unjustified concern.401
Congress has repeatedly elevated obscure public officials to the klieg
lights of national scrutiny for alleged wrongdoing or as symbols of a
disfavored policy choice. While there are certainly acts worthy of
scrutiny and policies worthy of debate, the partisan nature of
395. Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 98 (D.D.C. 2008).
396. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C.
2013).
397. Id.
398. See, e.g., Yaron Z. Reich, Comment, United States v. AT&T: Judicially Supervised
Negotiation and Political Questions, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 466, 467 (1977) (articulating
justifications for, and advantages of, negotiated or judicially imposed settlements of
interbranch oversight disputes).
399. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 798–800 (arguing that there are strong policy
justifications for congressional oversight as a check on executive power).
400. See id. at 799.
401. See id. at 813–14 (describing costs of chilled deliberations resulting from
congressional investigations).
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congressional oversight proceedings, coupled with frequent assertions of
unsubstantiated allegations as established facts and abusive treatment of
witnesses, threatens to chill legitimate executive branch conduct and
deliberations.
Moreover, not all deliberative processes are created equal. It is
important to protect all sorts of executive branch deliberations,
including policy formulation, personnel action, adjudicative
proceedings, litigation positions, prosecutorial decisions, contract
awards, pardon decisions, presidential appointments, presidential
communications, and onward. However, because many of these
deliberations must yield to congressional oversight interests, especially
after a policy is enacted, the need for deliberative space is attenuated.402
Some, though, like pardon decisions, have independent constitutional
significance as core presidential functions.
Still others take on
constitutional significance due to the facts of the particular deliberation
coupled with a determination by the President that they are worthy of
the imprimatur of executive privilege.
Of particular note, some congressional requests seek deliberative
information that would undermine the separation in separation of
powers. For example, Chairman Issa’s letter responding to President
Obama’s assertion of executive privilege concluded with a request that
the White House “identify any communications, meetings, and
teleconferences between the White House and the Justice Department
between February 4, 2011,” the date the Justice Department first
responded to a congressional inquiry, “and June 18, 2012, the day before
. . . [the assertion of] privilege.”403 Chairman Issa, in effect, asked the
President to disclose to Congress all of the executive branch
deliberations about how to respond to a ranging and partisan
congressional investigation. In fact, it is this very tactic on the part of
the Oversight Committee—seeking to peer into the internal executive
branch responses to Oversight Committee stimuli—that serves as the
basis for much of President Obama’s assertion of privilege.404

402. Order at 2, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Holder, No. 12-cv-01332-ABJ
(D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2014), ECF No. 81 (order denying both parties’ motions for summary
judgment) (“[T]here are two essential requirements for application of the deliberative process
privilege: the material covered by the privilege must be predecisional, and it must be
deliberative.” (citing In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).

403. Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 7.
404. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Motion for
Summ. J., supra note 374, at 20–22.
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There were troubling implications of the district court’s justiciability
opinion in Oversight Committee v. Holder.
After establishing
jurisdiction, the district court nevertheless categorized essential
separation of powers questions on the merits of the dispute as
potentially nonjusticiable questions.405 Specifically, the court suggested
that questions of congressional “need for the material,” the “merits of
the grounds for withholding” by the Executive, and the adequacy of the
Attorney General’s offers of accommodation would “put the Court
squarely in the position of second guessing political decisions and take it
well outside of its comfortable role of resolving legal questions that are
amenable to judicial determination.”406
If a court is going to resolve an important dispute between Congress
and the President, congressional need, withholding grounds, and
accommodation alternatives are the essential inquiry. Otherwise, the
exercise could be almost clerical in that the court could simply offer a
binary ruling: deliberative process privilege is available or not. Then,
the court would basically assess whether the committee had jurisdiction
over the matter, whether the subpoena was duly executed, and whether
the documents in dispute were responsive. Swept away would be any
particularized analysis of the executive branch confidentiality interests
in a categorical exercise. Such a ruling would adopt the congressional
litigation model nearly wholesale, to the detriment of the constitutional
structure. The court had adopted the Oversight Committee’s frame of
the question presented: “[C]an the executive properly assert executive
privilege to shield an agency’s deliberative processes when the records
in dispute do not reveal advice provided to the President himself or
address his core constitutional functions?”407
A categorical ruling about the availability of deliberative process
privilege would provide no check against unscrupulous or unskillfully
drafted discovery requests. In the context of a congressional subpoena
challenged by an individual as overbroad on Fourth Amendment
grounds, the Supreme Court has observed: “[A]dequacy or excess in the
breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature,

405. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–25 (D.D.C.
2013).
406. Id. at 25.
407. Id. at 17 n.7.
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purposes and scope of the inquiry.”408 Moreover, as expressed in
Cheney, the Supreme Court views tailored discovery as an essential
safeguard for separation of powers.409 For the Holder court to issue a
binary ruling as to the deliberative process privilege, rather than
engaging in particularized analysis of the scope of the inquiry, would be
incongruent with the Supreme Court precedent related to tailored
discovery.
It would also render irrelevant a demonstration of congressional
need in relation to the documents sought. The need and grounds
dichotomy is especially integral to the dispute in Holder. The district
court acknowledges that the documents at this point do not address the
problematic ATF tactics involved in Fast and Furious: “The facts have
been uncovered; the risks inherent in the operation—risks that were
tragically realized in the death of a federal law enforcement officer—
have been exposed; and the Department has issued clear directives
prohibiting similar conduct in the future.”410 The notion that the
underlying facts about controversial ATF investigative tactics have
come to light and been remedied should bear on the analysis of
Congress’s need to further intrude on executive branch deliberations.
This observation raises another sensitivity in the Holder opinion.
What is largely at issue now is Congress’s desire to conduct an
“obstruction” investigation related to a February 4, 2011, letter411 to
Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) that contained inaccurate information
in response to his inquiry about initial Operation Fast and Furious
allegations.412 The Department later indicated it lacked confidence in
the letter, which it ultimately withdrew.413 In fact, Congress received a

408. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 382 (1960) (alteration in original) (quoting
Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
409. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 386–87 (2004).
410. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
411. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Charles Grassley, Ranking
Minority Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 4, 2011).
412. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3–4. Congress calls this letter a “lie” in its brief. See
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 300, at 3. This assertion is contested by the
Executive Branch and Democrats, who cite an evidentiary record indicating that the author
of the letter provided the inaccurate information based on representations made by other
components in the field. See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 75, at
9–10.
413. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
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fulsome factual airing on how it was drafted.414 Such disclosure was a
significant accommodation by the Executive to allow a window into its
deliberative processes vis-à-vis Congress, but one that was warranted
under the circumstances of the inaccurate representation.
As noted above, however, the congressional subpoena calls for
vastly broader and more intrusive information. It seeks to peer into
deliberations within the Executive about how to deal with Congress
itself, which has no bearing on the investigation of the Operation in
question. What is troubling, however, is how dismissive the district
court was of the special nature of the deliberations involved, at least in
the context of rejecting the Attorney General’s framing of the question
presented by the litigation.415
A categorical ruling denying the applicability of deliberative process
privilege to congressional subpoenas would then leave viable only
presidential communications privilege. That would unduly confine
legitimate confidentiality interests to those in personal proximity to the
President rather than recognizing the multiplicity of functions, informed
by deliberations of varying importance, across the Executive Branch. It
would favor form over function and vindicate the congressional
litigation model to the exclusion of competing values.
While the courts have a role to play as final arbiter, the currency of
congressional–executive relations should be accommodation and
compromise. Therefore, the task for the judiciary in Holder is to try to
preserve that delicate balance in our constitutional scheme. It is a
balance that provides Congress with a robust investigative power,
encourages executive branch responsibility, preserves executive
functions, incentivizes informal conflict resolution, and minimizes
judicial involvement. The court should ensure that its ruling promotes
these constitutional values.
First, as the beneficiary of the status quo ante, the Executive must
believe it could be forced by a court to comply with a subpoena. While
there are routine incentives to resolve oversight conflicts, as well as
congressional self-help remedies, there are cases from time to time that
seem incapable of resolution. Such cases, if left without any resolution,

414. See Jonathan Strong, Justice Department Reveals Origins of False Gun Letter to
Grassley, ROLL CALL (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.rollcall.com/news/justice_department_reveal
s_origins_of_false_gun_letter_to_grassley-210742-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8YCJNREM.
415. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 16–17 n.7.
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could unduly tip the overall scheme in favor of unscrupulous executive
activity. Therefore, there needs to be a threat of judicial involvement,
albeit remote, encouraging the White House to compromise.
Second, there must be uncertainty about the outcome in a given
case. If the courts merely decide, wholesale, whether certain privileges
are available to the Executive vis-à-vis Congress, then the courts will
have done significant violence to the structural separation of powers. If
the courts adopt the congressional reading of Espy that would render
deliberative process privilege, no matter the specific factual application,
to be a mere common law—and hence inapplicable—privilege, it would
undermine important executive branch functions. State secrets doctrine
and presidential communications privilege do not cover the range of
legitimate executive branch concerns. Congress’s discovery excesses,
like those in Holder, would also be left unchecked. Alternatively, if the
courts hold the deliberative process privilege available to the Executive
without regard to Congress’s legitimate oversight interests, it would
serve to eliminate the threat of judicial involvement, and again, the
Executive would lack proper incentive to comply with congressional
information requests.
Third, when called into the fray, the courts need to adopt the role of
mediator in the first instance, which will hopefully promote settlement
by means of facilitated accommodation. Failing that, the courts need to
get into the muck and mire of document-by-document in camera review.
Such a process should be governed by legal standards that give due
regard to the multiplicity of context-specific outcomes.
Each
investigative dispute will involve a unique equation of congressional
needs and executive confidentiality grounds.
Neither branch will be wholly comfortable with this approach to
resolving congressional–executive oversight disputes. While generally
adopting the competing interests concept of the executive branch
transactional model, this approach rejects the Executive’s
nonjusticiability arguments. On the other hand, Congress will not be
pleased with the idea of a searching court review of investigative needs
and discovery tradecraft. Congress, and its advocates, will also likely be
concerned about any expansion (in its view) of executive privilege
doctrine. Neither branch will enjoy searching inquiry by the judiciary.
However, this approach allows for judicial resolution of irreconcilable
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interbranch oversight disputes of sufficient import that they lead to
contempt citation and executive privilege assertion.
The court’s first ruling in the merits phase of Holder, however,
signaled its sensitivity to these concerns.416 The court ordered the
Department of Justice to produce an executive privilege log analogous
to an attorney–client privilege log in regular civil litigation. The court’s
Solomonic reasoning surely caused consternation at both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue.
Relying on Espy, the court observed that “precedent binding on this
Court establishes the existence of a deliberative process privilege as a
form of executive privilege, but it also sets forth the prerequisites that
must be established before that privilege can be recognized.”417
Recognizing the value of interbranch-accommodated dispute resolution,
the court had referred the parties to a judicial mediator, to no avail by
the time of the privilege log ruling opinion. The opinion continues on
that path by narrowing, and delaying, the dispute by means of the
privilege log on a path toward judicially facilitated accommodation.
Production of a privilege log to Congress presents a political
problem for the Executive that is not present in normal litigation.
Disclosure of the participants to conversations but not the substance is
the traditional format of attorney–client privilege logs, but one can
readily imagine the coming congressional characterization of entries in
the privilege log reflecting innocuous but potentially privileged
communications between Department and White House officials. Such
disclosures, and the politicized characterization of them, will add
pressure to the Executive to reach a compromise.
On the other hand, Congress lost its most prized legal—litigation
model—argument. Congress had advanced a long-held institutional
view that the deliberative process privilege was categorically unavailable
to the Executive as a defense against a congressional subpoena.418 As
noted above, Congress argued that deliberative process privilege is
derived from the common law and, unlike presidential communications
privilege, does not enjoy constitutional status.419 Thus, deliberative

416. Order, supra note 402, at 1.
417. Id.
418. The House brief included a section titled, “Deliberative Process Privilege . . . Does
Not Apply to Congressional Subpoenas.” Mem. of P.&A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
supra note 362, at 25–33.
419. Id. at 27.
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process privilege is akin to attorney–client privilege, which Congress
may choose to honor or disregard on a case-by-case basis.420 The
Executive advanced an equally deeply held view to the contrary, that
the deliberative process privilege is one constitutionally grounded
component of an umbrella doctrine of executive privilege.421 The court
rejected Congress’s “suggestion that the only privilege the executive can
invoke in response to a subpoena is the Presidential communications
privilege.”422
Judicial resolution of categorical questions such as the availability, or
not, of deliberative process privilege could alter the separation of
powers. Congress and the Executive have tended to state their positions
in categorical terms. In this case, the Executive lost its chief categorical
argument against the justiciability of the dispute, and Congress lost on
its article of faith that deliberative process privilege held mere common
law status.
Once the privilege log is produced, and barring a settlement by the
branches, it will be interesting to see how the court weighs congressional
need for information against executive confidentiality interests. Both of
those calculations, while essential to the dispute, are inherently political.
Questions of justiciability and privilege availability decided, the Holder
court will continue to contend with litigation and transactional models at
the document-level privilege analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that Congress and the Executive have
fundamentally divergent views of the nature of constitutional structure.
Congress’s investigative model of oversight seeks to establish its
superior position in a hierarchy and its entitlement to nearly all
executive branch materials. In contrast, the Executive focuses on its
branch equality and views these interactions as transactional rather than
procedural. More than a constitutional theory, these divergent views
explain branch behavior, in practice, at every stage of oversight
interaction: document requests, phone calls, briefings, letter exchanges,
subpoenas, contempt votes, executive privilege assertions, and contempt
litigation briefs.
420. Id. at 30.
421. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Motion for
Summ. J., supra note 374, at 20–21.
422. Order, supra note 402, at 2.
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Holder focuses on whether deliberative process privilege is a valid
basis for President Obama’s assertion of executive privilege over the
remaining documents sought by Congress in connection with Fast and
Furious. However, it raises far more profound issues about the nature
of interbranch relations because it invites the courts to choose one of the
two models. The courts should decline the invitation, and thus far the
district court appears to be proceeding with a negotiated, or perhaps
imposed, settlement in mind. Both branches claim too much, but their
models also serve constitutional values. Importantly, the congressional
litigation model contemplates judicial imposition where executive
recalcitrance borders on lawlessness. And the transactional model’s
central premise—that Congress and the Executive have competing
legitimate interests—is a better reflection of a healthy constitutional
scheme than one in which the Executive is a regulated entity and
Congress is the regulator. Both branches claim interests that are
compelling and raise valid concerns about the other branch’s
perspective.
There should be a strong presumption against judicial resolution of
congressional oversight disputes in categorical terms. The Executive is
correct that routine judicial involvement in such disputes gives rise to
real danger along the lines of the Heisenberg Principle. While all three
branches have a role in interpreting their own roles in the constitutional
scheme, the judiciary is the first among equals. As such, it has
jurisdiction to decide interbranch oversight dispute cases in order to
preserve order. Article III tribunals need to use the scalpel rather than
meat axe when presented with bickering political branches.
As litigation proceeds to the merits in Holder, the court appears to
appreciate that congressional need and confidentiality grounds are the
essential elements of inquiry in any effort to resolve this dispute.
Further, the court should evaluate these needs and grounds against the
backdrop of other political remedies available to Congress. It should
give due focus on mediation principles that facilitate accommodation
and compromise rather than establishing categorical congressional
entitlements or presidential prerogatives. It needs to be solicitous of
executive branch concerns while facilitating congressional needs in a
particularized fashion. To do otherwise could do violence to structural
separation of powers.

